Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship by Villiers, Janice D.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 1 Article 3 
January 2021 
Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in 
the Counseling Relationship 
Janice D. Villiers 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling 
Relationship, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1 (1996). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CLERGY MALPRACTICE REVISITED: LIABILITY FOR




Clergy' counseling2 clients3 today face challenges in several spheres,
including the spiritual, the moral, and the secular. As the clergy face these
challenges, blurred boundaries result in some clergy engaging in prohibited
sexual contact with vulnerable parishioners.4
Although this behavior is not a late twentieth century phenomenon,5 the
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M.A., New York University, 1979; J.D., Columbia University, 1989. The views expressed are
solely those of the author and do not reflect those of any entities or organizations. The author
wishes to thank Margaret V. Turano and Philip' Weinberg for their helpful comments and sugges-
tions. Special thanks to Rick Kim, Alison Kelly, Maydia Luben, and Mary Sheridan for their
valuable research assistance.
1. The term "clergy" is used to denote religious leaders. There are 166 separate religious
groups in the United States. Census of Religious Groups in the U.S., in THE WORLD ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FACTS 644, at 644-45 (1996). Each denomination may be subdivided further into
thousands of churches, the parishioners of which hold common views, and hundreds of different
ecclesiastical offices (e.g. nuns, mothers superior, brothers, fathers, priests, bishops, cardinals,
evangelists, pastors, elders, apostles, prophets, rabbis, vicars, seers, etc.). Samuel E. Ericsson,
Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REv. 163, 170 (1981)
[hereinafter Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice]. A functional definition given by one commentator
is "those persons ordained, licensed, or otherwise empowered by a church or a sect, following
training prescribed by that organization, to provide spiritual or pastoral counseling to members and
others requesting such guidance." C. Eric Funston, Made out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional
Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REv. 507, 508 n.12 (1983).
2. "Counseling," as used in this article, refers to a pastoral relationship between a member
of the clergy and any person to whom that cleric provides counseling, pastoral care, spiritual
guidance, or direction. This includes the hearing of a confession, or confidential or privileged
information from a congregant.
3. "Clients," in the context of the counseling relationship with a member c the clergy, is
used to denote parishioners or followers, and is used interchangeably with those '.erms in this
article. This article also uses the term "women" to refer to clients, because cases of sexual abuse
of male clients by female clerics are rare. See infra note 87.
4. Sexual relationships between clergy and adult parishioners are not necessarily voluntary
consensual relationships. Consent on the part of the parishioner may be illusory, because the
power relationship is disproportionate, and the clergy's role as emotional and spiritual counselors
adds to the power imbalance as the sharing of intimate details in the counseling relationship
increases a woman's vulnerability. See Eduardo Cruz, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock:
Clergy Sexual Exploitation and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 499, 502 (1991).
The psychological phenomenon of transference compounds the inability of the woman undergoing
counseling to consent. Id.
5. See MARIE M. FORTUNE, Is NOTMNG SACRED? xii (1989) [hereinafter FORTUNE, IS
NOTHING SACRED]. Reverend Fortune relates the story of Henry Ward Beecher, a leader in the
abolition and suffrage movements and pastor of Plymouth Congregation Church, who in 1872 was
accused of a sexual liaison with Elizabeth Tilton, a married parishioner. The congregation
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current litigious climate increases the potential liability of churches and their
clergy. Despite the heightened awareness of the extent of clergy malpractice,
the subject is still discussed in hushed tones, as taboo as incest, within
congregations where such behavior occurs.6 Recently, clergy accused of
pedophilia have garnered considerable press attention and the ire of the
general public.7 Many of the more notorious cases have involved juveniles,8
but this article limits itself to actions brought by female adult victims of clergy
sexual misconduct, and views these cases as reflective of a larger
problem-the role of women in society and in the church.' Women plaintiffs
are generally viewed less sympathetically. Frequently, women who are abused
by clergy find little refuge in the courts, because clergy malpractice'0 is not
recognized as a viable cause of action." Courts dismiss the clergy
malpractice cases for various reasons, with constitutional prohibitions
defended the charismatic church leader despite the presence of other accusers, and he publicly
denied any wrongdoing, while privately admitting to the sexual misconduct. Id. "[T]he scandal as
it was viewed then was Beecher's disregard for Victorian morality and his hypocrisy. Questions
were never raised about his professional ethics as a pastor in relation to his parishioners." Id. at
xi-xii. In her book, the Rev. Fortune also relates the story of the Rev. Peter Donovan, a modem-
day Henry Beecher. Id. at xiii. Donovan, a charismatic young preacher, developed a loyal follow-
ing and despite the testimony of many women who were abused by him, the congregation sup-
ported him until his resignation. Donovan's victims became disillusioned by the hierarchical
church and the parishioners' lack of support for them. Id.
6. The church as family is a metaphor which aids to build "intimate, caring relationships"
within the church, and the church reacts like family members to the revelation of incest. Id. at xiv-
xv; see Kenneth L. Woodward & Patricia King, When a Pastor Turns Seducer, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
28, 1989, at 48; Ann-Janine Morey, Blaming Women for the Sexually Abusive Male Pastor, CHRI-
STIAN CENTURY, Oct. 5, 1988, at 866. Morey states:
Sexual abuse by pastors exhibits the same dynamic as incestuous abuse, which takes
place within the context of an intimate relationship (family, church, counseling) between
an authoritative and powerful person (a relative or minister) and a person who is
vulnerable to and trusting of that power (a child or counselee). Victims often feel
responsible for the abuser's activity and so are bound in secrecy by a double burden of
guilt and shame. Even if the victim does speak up, she or he may not be believed.
Id.
7. E.g., Martha Sawyer Allen, She Wanted Support; Pastor Wanted More, STAR TRIBUNE,
Feb. 21, 1993, at 18A.
8. See id. Gary Schoener of Minneapolis, a national expert on sexual misconduct by
professionals, reports that although the cases involving Roman Catholic priests who abuse children
have received greater media coverage, the vast majority of cases involve adults, and a large
number occur within the Protestant denominations. Id. Catholic priests, because of their vow of
celibacy, may be media targets when cases involving sexual misconduct are reported. It may be
also that the prurient interest of the public contributes to the sensationalism of cases involving
pedophilia.
9. No national statistics are available on sexuil misconduct by clergy. A three-year survey
of religious and secular counselors conducted by the Wisconsin Coalition on Sexual Misconduct
found that 11% of the perpetrators were clerics, and 89% of the victims were women. Woodward
& King, supra note 6, at 48.
10. Although liability for malpractice has been imposed on those who practice in the areas
of psychiatry, psychology, and even in social work, there has been an insurmountable stumbling
block in imposing similar liability on clergy. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. In
referring to clergy malpractice, I am limiting my discussion to sexual misconduct by a member of
the clergy in his or her capacity as counselor or advisor to a parishioner. It is essentially a claim
that the clergy has failed to use due care while counseling. See generally Constance Frisby Fain,
Clergy Malpractice: Liability for Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 MisS. C. L.
REv. 97, 98 (1991) (advocating imposition of liability when clergy fail to use due care).
1I. See Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First
Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1986).
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regarding the free exercise of religion being the one most frequently cited. 2
By dismissing these cases, the courts have resurrected the concept of
charitable immunity-long discarded in most states by either judicial decision
or legislative fiat. 3
The Right Reverend Orris G. Walker, Episcopal Bishop of Long Island,
states in a foreword to a diocesan publication on procedures for handling
reports of sexual misconduct:
To be a minister in the Church is to be entrusted with sacred
responsibilities. As ministers, we become important symbols of moral
and spiritual integrity, and people expect us to act in their best
interests. Sexual harassment or abuse is a betrayal of the sacred trust
placed in the one who ministers and is a damaging experience for all
parties involved. Exploitative sexual behavior, because it is focused
on one's personal gratification at the expense of the humanity of
another person, is contrary to what the Gospel teaches. Therefore,
those who sexually abuse or sexually harass someone who is in a
ministerial relationship with them, exhibit unethical as well as
unprofessional behavior.4
This article proposes that sexual misconduct of clergy with a counselee
amounts to malpractice. During an emotional or psychological crisis, many
parishioners seek counseling from a local pastor. If such outreach for help
results in abuse, it is especially contemptible because the perpetrator's power
and authority are perceived as derived from God. 5 However, blaming the
victim--often engaged in even by the victim-is a common response.' 6 The
woman is viewed as a seductive temptress, leading the righteous clergy
astray. 7 Even in the face of overwhelming evidence of clergy misdeeds,
12. Id. Esbeck posits that despite the civil courts' neutral role in deciding a case initiated by
one of the parties, the mere holding that a claim is justiciable raises serious issues concerning
"interference with church affairs and ... religious liberty." Id. He describes many tort claims,
including claims of clergy malpractice, as being incompatible with the separation of church and
state. Id. at 6.
13. Annotation, Immunity of Nongovernmental Charity from Liability for Damages in Tort,
25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979). Section 895E states:
"One engaged in a charitable, educational, religious or benevolent enterprise or activity is not for
that reason immune from tort liability." Id. Some states, such as Massachusetts, place strict limits
of $20,000 on liability of non-profit organizations. Alison Bass, Law Limits Church Liability to
$20,000, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1992, at 8. South Carolina, Maryland and Texas impose
similar limits, and Arkansas gives nonprofit institutions complete immunity from all legal
damages. Id.
14. The Diocesan Pastoral Concerns Committee, Policies and Procedures for Preventing and
Responding to Allegations of Sexual Misconduct in the Ministerial Relationship Within the
Diocese of Long Island, Apr. 1993.
15. See Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48; see also FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED,
supra note 5, at 102 (describing the power as derived from training, credentials, gifts, and the
employment contract between the laity and the clergy). "The minister is a physical representation
of the whole community of faith, of the tradition, of a way of viewing the meaning of life ... and
of God." Id. (quoting DAVID K. SwrrzER, PASTOR, PREACHER, PERSON: DEVELOPING A PASTORAL
MINISTRY IN DEPTH 17 (1979)).
16. See FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 105, 122; Morey, supra note 6, at
866, 869.
17. See infra note 26, and accompanying text.
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many parishioners still support the pastor and denounce the female victim. 8
Afterwards, the victim seldom feels safe in the church. She feels betrayed,
hurt, and angry, primarily because of a lack of responsiveness to her plight
within the church hierarchy. 9 Professionals, whether they serve in the secular
world or the church, should be liable when they fail to meet a certain standard
of care toward their clients. Interestingly, some courts, while refusing to
recognize a cause of action for malpractice, have applied fiduciary law to
impose liability upon clergy. Other courts have refused to apply either theory
to allow recovery for women who have been sexually abused by clergy. 0
The doctrine of separation of church and state does not relieve the state of
its responsibility to protect its citizens from harm when clergy are engaged in
nonreligious activities. If women do not get redress for these wrongs, they are
victimized repeatedly, first by the clergy and then by the legal system. To
correct this manifest injustice, the courts must acknowledge the balance
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution, where an equally powerful state
and church coexist. This balance is-not upset by recognition of the clergy
malpractice action.2 '
Churches often respond to allegations of transgressions by clergy with
silence, and occasional denials-from both the clergy's superiors and the
congregations. Forcing clergy and their churches to accept secular legal
liability and responsibility for their tortious wrongs should have a deterrent
18. The Rev. Thomas Streitferdt was convicted of one count of rape and three counts of
sexual abuse. The attack on three female members of his congregation took place during
counseling sessions in the basement of the East Harlem Church. After his conviction, his
congregation welcomed him back with open arms and told him not to resign as pastor. Dan
Andrews, Convicted Pastor Welcomed Back by Flock, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 28, 1989. Often'
the pastors are charismatic and weave a web of betrayal which is not easily penetrated. This
"web" and the collar protect pastors from the accusations of the women, and the pastors are
cognizant of the fact that they are more credible than the less influential female accusers. See
FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 65, 81-87, 104-05 (reporting that during the
investigation of a clergyman's misdeeds, the parishioners concluded that "the women were the
source of the problem," resulting in stigmatization, isolation, and silencing of the female accusers).
19. See Allen, supra note 7, at 18A; FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 110-
11, 127-29; see also Gayle White, When Men of the Cloth Fall from Grace, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., July 27, 1991, at E6 (describing the feeling of betrayal experienced by women, often
resulting in leaving organized religion and a loss of faith in God, the latter having been termed the
"God factor"-where victims are left blaming God for violating their sacred trust). There are some
instances when, even among "consenting adults," the effect of the liaison can be post-traumatic
stress disorder, characterized by flashbacks, which is usually seen in veterans of war. Post-
traumatic stress disorder occurs when a "person has experienced an event that is outside the range
of usual human experiences and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone."
DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 250 (3rd ed. rev. 1987). It has been
identified in victims of battering. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater,
Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African American Woman and the Battered Woman Syn-
drome, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1995). Women who are sexually abused by their therapists
have also manifested the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Ronald J. Maurer, Ohio
Psychotherapists' Civil Liability for Sexual Relations with Former Patients, 26 U. TOL. L. REV.
547, 558 (1995).
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. Other commentators have suggested that only tort claims that address compelling societal
interests of health, safety, or public peace should be permitted. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 6, 8
(suggesting that in order to maintain the balance envisioned by the Framers, religious
organizations must be afforded a high level of immunity from governmental interference). This is
described as the price one pays for living in a free and plural society. Id.
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effect on such behavior. It would also force churches to begin the painstaking
process of self-evaluation and development of policies and procedures to assist
in reporting and treatment-to benefit the victim and the clergy.22 On rare
occasions, churches become hypersensitive because of fear of litigation and
penalize the cleric accused of sexual misconduct without due process.
Part II of this article views the response to clergy sexual misconduct as
systemic-an issue deeply rooted in women's role in society as well as their
role in a patriarchal church. Part III discusses the problem of clergy sexual
misconduct, explores the churches' delayed recognition of a need for internal
monitoring, and critiques the judiciary's inadequate response to the problem.
Part IV discusses solutions, including the approaches taken by legislatures to
curb abuses by clergy engaged in counseling relationships and potential
solutions in the courts employing a fiduciary duty or professional malpractice
paradigm. The conclusion summarizes viable solutions to this problem,
fashioning narrow remedies which will address the problem without creating
additional difficulties in their wake.
II. CLERGY MALPRACTICE AS A WOMEN'S ISSUE
The patriarchal organizational structure of the church plays a key role in
the problem of the failure to recognize clergy misconduct as a viable cause
action, because patriarchal views are integrated in the legal process, to the
detriment of women.23 If women do not have a voice, the church and the
courts will not believe their accusations and take official corrective action.'
The unresolved and most divisive questions in many denominations involve
"[q]uestions of women's ordination, women's employment as pastors,
22. Many churches have no policies or procedures in place for the resolution of the problem
of sexual misconduct of clergy. Rev. Fortune attributes this to the myopia of the institutional
church: "Conservative churches deny the existence of the problem as long as possible. When they
cannot deny it any longer, they deal with it as a matter of the pastor's adultery, ignoring the issue
of professional ethics. ... [In addition, due to lack of affiliation,] there is no denominational
structure to monitor or discipline clergy." FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 100.
More liberal churches, in an attempt to increase employment opportunities for gay and lesbian
clergy, have removed all references to clerical sexual conduct. Id. "[Tihese well-motivated actions,
which sought not to prescribe sexual behavior for clergy's private lives, left the District with no
standards of professional conduct." Id. at 101.
23. Angela L. Padilla & Jennifer J. Winrich, Christianity, Feminism, and the Law, 1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 67, 73, 87-102 (1991); Michael McAteer, A Voice for Catholic Feminists,
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 10, 1994, at H24. Maria Riley (a member of the Dominican order of nuns
as well as a research staff member and coordinator of the Women's Project at Washington's
Center for Concern) stated that the women's movement "is impacting on the Church because one
of the fundamental issues is patriarchy or the subordination of women by men .... [T]he fact that
these are women's voices that are now being raised is particularly problematic to some of the
male leaders of the church." Id.; see also Joan Leonard, Women Challenge Church for Equality,
CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 12, 1994, at 9A (postulating that the current and traditional patriarchy
"excludes the presence, insights and experience of women ... [and] rob[s] women of their full
personhood," while encouraging "men to be domineering, aggressive and selfish").
24. It is extremely difficult to understand why women bringing these charges are often not
believed, since "very rarely do victims falsely report an offense. If they have the courage to tell
someone about their situation, they almost always have been harmed by someone." Marie M.
Fortune, Reporting Child Abuse: An Ethical Mandate for Ministry, in ABUSE AND RELIGION:
WHEN PRAYING ISN'T ENOUGH 193 (Anne L. Horton & Judith A. Williamson eds., 1988)
[hereinafter Fortune, Child Abuse].
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contraception, inclusive language, abortion, sexuality, and so forth . ".."25
Most churches still maintain a structure under which men have the power of
authority on the altar, while women fill the pews-outnumbering men in most
congregations. This patriarchal structure facilitates manipulative abusers and
increases their access to vulnerable parishioners.
Women's experiences receive scant attention in the "theology, ethics,
doctrine, or pastoral care. If considered at all, women's experiences carry an
overlay of the image of woman as temptress, source of evil, and 'gateway to
hell. . ,"" The most striking exception in Christian theology is the elevated
status of Mary-revered for her role as the virginal mother of the son of
God-a paradoxical and unattainable image for women." Thus, the church is
merely a mirror of society's view of women, albeit a distorted mirror,
reflecting more of the past than the present or the future. While this inequality
exists in society, and is reflected in the church, it will be difficult to address
25. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 123.
26. Id.; see also Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 73-87 (describing the view of woman
as guilty and deserving of punishment based on Eve's role in the creation story and in mankind's
fall from grace and as seductive and wily based on the story of Lot's daughters' role in seducing
their father in order to preserve their father's blood line). In Genesis 19:32-36, Lot's daughters
conspire to ply their father with wine and share his bed without his knowledge. "This highly
unlikely scenario sets the stage for a 'blame the victim' attitude about female victims of sexual
offenses, and it allows the true aggressor to escape guilt." Id at 79. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1135, 1154-55 (1990) describes medieval views of women as an afterthought, discussed
only in terms of their differences from men: "Feminine nature was conceived as being the oppo-
site of male nature [which was defined by the feudal society and the loyalty and love of a vassal
to his lord]: individualistic, selfish, cunning, and sexually voracious." Id. at 1155. Professor Schro-
eder describes one medieval interpretation of original sin where Eve ate the fruit of the Garden of
Eden in an effort to be autonomous (God-like). Adam viewed this as an impossible and unwel-
come aspiration, but realized that Eve would be damned, and out of love and loyalty for her,
abandoned his duty to God. Id. It was the rare woman who could control her natural individualis-
tic and selfish desires and remember the honor of the family and community, which was the natu-
ral desire of men. Women, by their nature, were a constant threat to the order of society and to
the purity and holiness of men. Id. at 1156. See also Pa6la Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduc-
tion, 37 Auz. L. REv. 453, 464-70 (1995) (discussing biblical and rabbinical ambivalence towards
women and misogynist views of women). Women are repeatedly depicted as temptresses, incapa-
ble of rational thought or moral decisions, particularly in matters of sexuality. Women needed to
be controlled, not only to protect them from falling victim to their own passions, but also to pro-
tect men from being led from the righteous path of virtue and intellect. Id. at 470.
27. Padilla and Winrich contrast the "bad" woman, epitomized by Eve, with the "good"
woman, epitomized by Mary:
For both men who judge women and women who judge themselves, the polarities are
clear. "[Woman's] 'Eve nature' justifies punishment .... [Slhe can be raped, battered,
dominated, exiled. When she is seen as 'Mary,' she is honored and patronized, protected
but excluded from decision making, seen as pure but without passion." Either way
women are victims of patriarchal morality. And in practice, they can never be "good"
because the inimicability of the virgin-mother model (literally understood) has left all
women essentially identified with Eve.
Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 84 (citations omitted).
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this problem adequately." The subordination of women-encompassed in the
biblical view of women-is ultimately evidenced in the legal system.
29
"Theology and law share much in common, including a long history of
justifying violence against women .... [Each institution is] mired in a
patriarchal history that renders them obsolete, and apparently unable to offer
any significant justice for young women victims of abuse."30 The parallels
between women's treatment in the judicial system and in the church are
striking, particularly with respect to the women's lack of voice as they rail
against these patriarchal systems. The women's movement has amplified the
voice of women demanding equal justice in the church and in society.
Feminists may disagree on the sources of women's oppression and the means
and strategies of empowerment, but many believe that "female subordination is
rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that blocks women's
28. Men in pastoral roles are aided by the patriarchal structure. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SA-
CRED, supra note 5, at 124. Rev. Fortune's case study of Peter Donovan describes a minister who
engaged in numerous sexual liaisons with female parishioners, including the rape of two women,
and promised marriage to others. Donovan's activities continued for years before he was forced to
resign. Id. at 46-47, 124. Fortune comments:
[lf Donovan had been engaging in the same conduct with men that he did with women
in the church, he would have been relieved of his pastoral privilege long ago. But the
fact that the victims were women, the acceptance of the adage that "boys will be boys,"
and the hesitancy of some men to confront other men's behavior all meant that the
women had to look initially outside of the church for a sympathetic ear and a person
willing to act. The patriarchy prevented the women from getting justice within the
church.
Id. at 124.
29. Padilla and Winrich suggest that religion and the law cooperate in this destructive
patriarchal view:
Because violence against women functions in a patriarchal society as a form of social
control, the legal system, by failing to take violence against women seriously, aids and
abets the continued existence of patriarchy. By blaming, disbelieving, and allowing the
female victim of domestic violence, incest and rape to blame herself for her
victimization, the legal system reproduces and legitimizes women's inferior status as
constructed in the traditional Christian world view. In turn, the religious system
"sacralizes" women's subordinate legal position and elevates social norms into divinely
mandated moral paradigms. Thus, religion and law, each in turn, legitimizes the other's
patriarchal construction of woman.
Padilla and Winrich, supra note 23, at 87-88. First published at the turn of the century, Matilda
Joslyn Gage's feminist work, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE, attributed many of the injustices
toward women in the United States to the influence that Christianity has had on the state. She
claimed that under "Usus," a form of Roman law prevalent before Christianity, women enjoyed
greater freedom and could maintain their own property during marriage. MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE,
WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN THROUGH
THE CHRISTIAN AGES 295-99 (1893).
In contrast, Christianity was synonymous with subordination of women:
From Moses to Paul, the Bible everywhere speaks of her as a being made for man,
secondary to man, and under his authority by direct command of the Almighty; the state
as coadjutor and servant of the church, basing her codes of law upon its teachings.
Under these codes woman has not only been looked upon as naturally unchaste, but also
regarded as a liar, the state demanding the testimony of two or three, and in some
instances of seven women to invalidate that of one man; clearing himself by his single
oath. Condemned as having brought evil into the world, woman's every step was looked
upon with suspicion, and short of her just desserts.
Id. at 305-06 (citation omitted).
30. Joyce A. Mercer, Legal and Theological Justice for Abused Adolescent Girls, 9 J.L. &
RELIGION 451, 451 (1992).
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entrance and/or success in the so-called public world."'" The lessons gleaned
from the difficulty women face in obtaining justice in the areas of incest,
domestic violence and sexual harassment can shed some light on the struggle
to obtain justice for abuse within the church. 2
A. Incest
Female victims of incest,33 like other female victims in a patriarchal
society, frequently have their harms discounted. 4 Incest occurs in the private
confines of the home, usually between a father or stepfather and a daughter.33
With the family serving as the model for interaction, as it does in the
church,36 incest thus arises within the same contexts, and creates the same
tensions, as clergy sexual abuse.37 While the feminist movement has been in
the forefront in seeking judicial redress for the victims of incest, its success
has been limited.3"
As is now the case with most victims of clergy malpractice, the harm to
female incest victims is ignored,39 or the focus of the inquiry is shifted to the
nature of the family's dysfunction, even when criminal penalties are
necessary.' Undoubtedly, the current criminal sanctions against defendants in
incest cases provide some deterrent.4' The literature shows, however, that
criminal proceedings are not often initiated, and that the defendants are rarely
31. ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 2, 8 (1989)
(surveying the strengths and weaknesses of feminist theories).
32. ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 2 (1984) [hereinafter TONG, WOMEN].
"[T]he law has frequently chosen to trivialize these harms [or] [w]here harm has resisted such
facile trivialization, the law has frequently sought to blame the victim for her plight." Id.; see also
FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 122.
33. Incest is defined as the crime of sexual intercourse or cohabitation between a man and
woman whose familial relationship would, at law, preclude marriage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
761 (6th ed. 1990). The vast majority of incest victims are female, while the perpetrators are
almost invariably male. JUDITH L. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 3-4 (1981).
34. Joyce McCell, Incest as Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on Private Wrong and Public
Harm, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L 143, 145 (1992).
35. id. at 143. The overwhelming majority-94.6%, to be precise-of the reported incest
cases involve father figures and daughters; less than 3% of the cases involve either father-son or
mother-son relationships. Id. There are no reported cases of mother-daughter incest Id.
36. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 99. "The church is frequently referred
to as the family of God." Id. This creates an unbalanced setting where the congregants place
unconditional trust in a pastor, not unlike that of children in their fathers. Id. at 103.
37. Just as members of the religious family are often more preoccupied with protecting the
image of the institution or the reputation of the clerics, so, too, are the parents concerned about
scandal, preserving the family unit, or keeping the male breadwinner in the home. Frequently
these concerns override the child's best interests. McConnell, supra note 34, at 172 nn.23-24
(quoting Diane H. Browning & Bonny Boatman, Incest: Children at Risk, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
69 (1977)).
38. McConnell, supra note 34, at 149.
39. The literature on incest victims, who are overwhelmingly female, is overly preoccupied
with the victims' complicity. Charlotte L. Mitra, Judicial Discourse in Father-Daughter Incest
Appeal Cases, 15 INT'L J. Soc. L. 121, 123 (1987); Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 90-92
(suggesting that mothers, as well as daughters, are frequently blamed).
40. Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 90-92.
41. Incestuous behavior is a felony in every state, and most states are making serious
attempts to prosecute child sexual abuse cases. Carol W. Napier, Note, Civil Incest Suits: Getting
Beyond the Statute of Limitations, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 995, 998 (1990).
[Vol. 74:1
CLERGY MALPRACTICE REVISITED
successfully prosecuted.42 Because of the inadequate redress obtained through
the routine channels in criminal or family law, an increasing number of adult
incest victims bring tort suits against close family members."3
Not surprisingly, incest claims seem to merit little consideration within the
tort system." Undaunted, incest victims have pursued compensatory damages
for their emotional and physical injuries, expensive psychological treatment,
and lost wages directly attributable to the serious debilitating impact of incest
on their lives.'5 Victims of clergy malpractice deserve no less for the proven
harms done to them. Trust in a clergy member makes the parishioner more
vulnerable and less likely to report the wrongdoer. A parallel exists to the
incest victim who remains silent for years after the abuse.' Once that trust is
betrayed, the victim loses not only trust in the cleric, but her faith in God and
the Church.47 The problem often is tied to the silencing of the victim that
occurs in the church and in society in general. The victim will often fear
reprisals, not only from the church and her fellow parishioners, but possibly
even divine retribution.' Those who oppose liability for clergy malpractice
state that if liability attaches for this behavior clergy will be at the mercy of
their female parishioners, who could misconstrue a simple show of concern, or
a fatherly touch, and ruin the reputation and career of innocent clergy.49
42. Joycelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an
Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2189 (1991). Some
commentators suggest two main reasons for the lack of enforcement of statutes which prohibit
domestic violence and incest: "[flirst, the lawyers, police, judges, and juries charged with carrying
out the law are impaired by patriarchal attitudes about a woman's subordinate status in
society;... [slecond, the female victims themselves, having internalized this debilitating
definition of their role, often do not seek legal remedies for their injuries." Padilla & Winrich,
supra note 23, at 90.
43. Lamm, supra note 42, at 2189.
44. Id. at 2190.
45. Id.
46. See Morey, supra note 6, at 866; see also FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5,
at xiv-xv, 103-106 (describing parishioner assumption of trust in the clergy).
47. Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL
2153 (1994). After the married victim engaged in the sexual relationship with the priest, who was
also married, she experienced a loss of faith in God and the Church. Id. at 312-18. When she
reported the sexual relationship to the Bishop, he advised her that if "she loved Father Robinson
she should not talk to anyone about her relationship with him, never go near the church, and never
talk to Father Robinson again." Id. at 318. Her loss of faith was aggravated when Bishop Frey
made her believe she was primarily at fault, never asked for her version of the story, never in-
quired as to her feelings about the relationship or her plans, and demanded secrecy from her. Id. at
318 n.9.
48. In order to engage in sexual relations with the women, the clerics often invoke God's
approval of the relationship, in the ultimate act of manipulation and selfishness. FORTUNE, Is
NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 65, 120-21 (discussing the alienation suffered by women who
report abuse within the church).
49. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 1991). Where a heightened standard of
pleading was introduced in negligent hiring claims, the court stated that "the goal of protecting the
reputations of upstanding members of the community is important enough to require that facts be
pled with particularity in order for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss." Id. Undoubtedly,
there is some merit in the concern about damaged reputations. For instance, Joseph Cardinal
Bernardin was accused of sexual misconduct on the basis of a "repressed memory," and the
accusation was later retracted. Margaret Carlson, Full of Grace, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 37.
Ironically, when his accuser died, Cardinal Bernardin stated that the incident, although regrettable
and painful, had positive effects, including improving his standing with the local Catholics.
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Certainly internal boards of review should be able to determine whether the
contact was sexual in nature and, if not, courts are able to discern sexual
touching." However, because the injuries claimed are often psychological or
emotional, some courts express a fear of fraud, especially when the claim is
made years after the alleged abuse?' This rationale for denying abused
women their voice in the churches and the courts seems to be based less on
concern for the clergy than on lack of concern for the women. The slow
response of the courts in providing remedies for women is a sign of societal
indifference to their plight. While everyone sympathizes with men wrongly
accused of rape, no one has suggested that the civil cause of action for sexual
battery should be abolished. Besides, concerns about fraud have not prevented
the imposition of liability on secular counselors.52 To deny all clergy
malpractice claims on this basis is thus unjust.
B. Domestic Violence
Most states prohibited wife-beating by 1870." Although it is
questionable whether a "rule of thumb" ever existed--giving men permission to
beat their wives, provided the stick used in the beating was no thicker than a
thumb 54-- many women, even at the beginning of this century, did not enjoy
a daily existence confident that they would be free from physical violence.5
Unfortunately, wife-beating has been "sanctioned and controlled through
culture, religious beliefs, law, and most importantly, the norms of friendship,
kinship and neighborhood groups."56
Andrew Herrmann, Bernardin Accuser Dies: Cook Charge May Have United Local Catholics,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at 9. A survey reported that 83% described him as a good
or excellent leader, and Cardinal Bernardin attributed this to his openness in handling the Cook
case. Id.; see also Scott Fornek, "He Will Accept God's Will and Move On From There":
Admirers Cite His Deep Faith and Work Ethic, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 11, 1995, at 16
("'I ... have a great faith-a faith in God, a faith in the people I serve. In the final analysis, that
kind of faith and a willingness and indeed a determination to make your best effort, that will carry
the day."'); Andrew Herrmann, Bernardin Achieves "Closure" With Accuser, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 3 ("[Tlhe meeting [between Bernardin and the man who had accused him
of sexual abuse] 'brought closure and peace to both of us."'). Cardinal Bernardin said, "'If there's
an accusation of sexual abuse against anyone, priest or otherwise, I think that that accusation has
to be taken seriously.... [l]n the final analysis, truth will win out."' Ohio Man Drops Cardinal
Bernardin from Suit Claiming Abuse, LIABILITY WK., March 7, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL
2541644.
50. See State v. Ohrtman, 466 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that pastor's
hug of a female parishioner during a counseling session which compressed her breasts against his
chest was not "touching" within the meaning of a statute which prohibited sexual contact with a
psychotherapist).
51. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 920 (1996) (denying.extension of a judicially created discovery rule on public policy
grounds).
52. See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
53. See generally SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY: WOMEN, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1992).
54. Henry A. Kelly, Rule of Thumb and the Folklaw of the Husband's Stick, 44 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 341, 341 (1994) (chronicling the dubious origin and frequent misuse of the term); see also
Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ.
J. 401 (1995) (asserting the relevance of family violence to family property policy).
55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-93 (1992).
56. "[U]nlike male victims of violent crime, women are prone to blame themselves for their
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In striving for an illusion of peaceful family life, society has traditionally
denied and suppressed the evidence of family violence." Only since the
1960s have the reality and depth of the problem of family
violence-particularly child abuse and wife-beating--earned widespread public
attention as a problem that knows no boundaries of class or color."
Frequently, women who report incidents of abuse in the home are not believed
because the men who beat them seem to epitomize respectability." Despite
the perception of marital abuse as a lower or working-class, people-of-color
problem, studies show that wife beating crosses all social classes and racial
lines.'
By the 1940s gender-neutral expressions such as "marital discord" and
"marital disharmony" surfaced, evidencing society's attempts to forge a
woman-blaming response to the problem.6 To many, marital violence
became a sign of wifely dysfunction. Often, battered wives would also blame
themselves by believing that they somehow deserved to be beaten. Frequently
after the authorities became involved, the man "bec[ame] contrite and
tender .... or the victim exhibit[ed] compassion or concern for the abuser." '62
Historically, the mostly-male authorities then retreated, treating the problem as
own victimization." TONG, WOMEN, supra note 32, at 195. Religious and family support groups
often focus on preserving the family unit and emphasize wifely submission when encouraging
women to remain in abusive homes. Fortune, Child Abuse, supra note 24, at 165.
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889.
58. Id.; see also Maria L. Ganga & Elizabeth Mehren, Simpson Case Compels Nation to
Look at Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMEs, June 20, 1994, at 1 (noting the celebrity of the domestic
violence case of O.J. Simpson). The nation also confronted the reality that domestic abuse cuts
across color and socioeconomic barriers when live-in-companions, Joel Steinberg, a lawyer, and
Hedda Nussbaum, an editor, were in the media spotlight for the traumatic death of their adopted
daughter at Steinberg's hands. People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 846 (N.Y. 1992). The courts
found that Hedda Nussbaum was also severely abused, and media attention focused momentarily
on both child and spousal abuse. Id. at 846-47.
59. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIvEs, 18-19 (1988) (describing an early
case history of the Amato family-a mother, father and six young children). Mrs. Amato sought
help from many social agencies and often reported that her husband was a "drunkard, a gambler, a
non-supporter, and a wife-beater." Id. at 18. Social workers doubted Mrs. Amato because Mr.
Amato appeared to be a "good and sober man" who blamed family problems on his wife's
inability to manage the wages he brought home to her. Id. Only the corroboration by her
husband's own father and physical evidence of abuse convinced the agencies. Id. at 19. Although
Mr. Amato was convicted of abuse and sentenced to six months in prison, he returned to the home
more violent and abusive than before, continuing to abuse his wife and children. Id. The case was
eventually closed with no resolution. Id.
60. Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Family Lawyers: The Need for an Identification
Protocol, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1027, 1027-135 (1995) (explaining that as one realizes battering occurs
in all socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic groups, it becomes clear that corporate lawyers will
encounter battered women.); see also Diane Patton, "He Never Hit Me"-The Need for Expert
Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases, Aiz. ATrr'Y, Jan. 30, 1994, at 10 (stating that wife
battering is a serious and prevalent problem which affects all socio-economic and religious
groups). The defense of battered woman's syndrome has been successful in cases where women
kill their batterer. Ammons, supra note 19 at 1015. However, some object to describing a
syndrome which will result in stereotyping and conviction for those who do not fit the stereotype.
Id. The battered woman stereotype is a "white, middle class, passive, weak woman who in a
moment of terror, lost control and committed a crime because she was being abused." Id. at 1016.
61. GORDON, supra note 59, at 284.
62. MARY J. FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW 555 (1992).
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a private family matter and less than serious.63 When battered women aligned
themselves with the feminist movement, the struggle was no longer an
individual one, but became both political and ideological. '
Women sexually abused by clergy share characteristics with physically
abused women-most notably the phenomenon of blaming the victim, and the
public reluctance to believe the women because the men seem highly credible
and respectable.' Like women in physically abusive relationships, women
who become engaged in sexual relationships during the course of counseling
are often living out a pattern of psychological abuse.' A cleric who
participates in such activity with a vulnerable parishioner is manipulative and,
like the wife beater, needs assistance. Often the men indulge in abusive acts
because they view it as low-risk; the women's self-esteem is so low that they
are unlikely to reveal the secret and, if they do, they are unlikely to be taken
seriously.67 The shame the women experience also silences them. Society
often views the female victim with incredulity. Women fear that speaking up
will lead others to believe that they are merely experiencing "buyers'
remorse"-belated regrets over unwise choices freely made by both parties.
By silencing the abused woman, society facilitates the abuser.
C. Sexual Harassment
Men inside and outside of the church complain about the labelling of
innocent behavior as sexual harassment.' These complaints frequently
demonstrate ignorance about the subject. The term "sexual harassment" is used
to identify "those kinds of sexual coercion and exploitation that occur neither
between complete strangers nor between purely social acquaintances or family
members, but between men and women in a formal structured relationship in
which women have an expectation that the basis of the relationship has
nothing to do with sex." Incidents of sexual harassment range from outright
demands for sexual services, vulgar advances, pinching, fondling, sexual
63. Id.
64. Id. at 288.
65. Linda Jorgenson & Rebecca Randles, Time Out: The Statue of Limitations and Fiduciary
Theory in Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct Cases, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 181, 200 (1991)
(suggesting that a double standard is working against women claiming sexual misconduct, because
their claims would be taken seriously if they complained of physical violence by their therapists).
Elijah Muhammad, 67 year-old leader of the Black Muslim Movement, allegedly "had intimacies"
with a "succession of personal secretaries" who became pregnant. MALCOLM X, AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF MALCOM X 299 (1964). The women were charged with adultery in Muslim courts and
received sentences of isolation, forbidden to have any contact with other Muslims. Id. When this
news was about to become public knowledge, the leaders of the movement "desperately wanted to
find some ... bridge-over which ... the Nation of Islam could be saved from self-destruction."
Id. at 302. Following a recurring theme, the reputation of the minister and the survival of the
religious group took precedence over the women and their children.
66. GORDON, supra note 59, at 285-86.
67. Id. at 284-86.
68. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 820-23 (1991).
69. Jill Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the
Distance Yet to Go. 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 445-46 (1981).
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remarks or jokes made in women's presence, to sexual assault.7" The
gravamen of a sexual harassment claim is a power imbalance.7
Frequently, incidents of sexual harassment occur in the workplace, with
the most notorious examples being the claims made by Professor Anita Hill
and others against Justice Clarence Thomas during his nomination hearing,"
and the mary accusations which culminated in the resignation of Senator
Packwood." Recent studies indicate that occupations of harassed women and
their harassers vary greatly and cross socioeconomic lines. Male harassers are
found among the ranks of doctors, lawyers, social workers, clergy persons,
salespersons, construction workers, auto mechanics, and librarians.74 Again
the voices of women were silenced when they sought remedies in the court.7"
Instead of disciplining men for such behavior, women were expected to
leave employment where they experienced such treatment.76 The women were
expendable, because their jobs were less important to the survival of the
companies.77 Few women complained, preferring to suffer in silence than
face the reprisals which would inevitably include loss of employment for the
victim rather than the harasser, or increased harassment." Some were told to
consider it a compliment or to stop the provocative dress or immoral behavior
that had encouraged the treatment by their male counterparts.79
The legislature, rather than the common law, finally provided a vehicle for
victims of harassment through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.80
Under Title VII, women who lost their jobs for resisting sexual demands
began to sue their former employers. Although early plaintiffs' cases were
unsuccessful in the district courts, the Third, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits upheld the right of a woman to sue for such employment
discrimination under this Act."' Finally, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson82
70. Id. at 448-55.
71. Estrich, supra note 68, at 820.
72. Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment of Sex
and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1367-68 (1992).
73. Harvey Berkman, With a Little Help from His Supporters: Senator Packwood's Allies
Contribute More Than $1 Million for His Defense, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at A6 (reporting
that Sen. Bob Packwood's "20 years worth of sexual harassment allegations" cost his political
supporters $1.1 million, and counting).
74. Goodman, supra note 69, at 453.
75. Ultimately Senator Packwood resigned from the Senate, the charges were dismissed by
the authorities, and the women harmed by Packwood were arguably harmed a second time when
he departed the Senate with emotional commendations from his colleagues, yet without any hint
of an apology to the injured women. See 141 CONG. REc. S12, 796-97 (1995).
76. See Goodman, supra note 69, at 456.
77. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 12-13 (1979).
78. Id. at 48-49 (discussing ongoing intimidations suffered by women during the
development of sexual harassment law).
79. Id.
80. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against
any individual ... because of ... sex .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
81. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044,
1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
82. 477 U.S. 57, 65-68 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII, and that the victim could not submit voluntarily to unlawful sex
discrimination).
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the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on a woman's right to sue under Title
VII for sexual harassment. Ironically, within the institution that passed Title
VII legislation, the voice of women crying out against sexual harassment in
the workplace was ignored. 3
Moreover, in a practical sense, women who sue have a substantial burden
to overcome by establishing that the sexual harassment they experience is
closely linked to their employment. Employers who can show that the
advances were of a "personal" nature and unrelated to the workplace will
prevail.84 Women who complain of sexual harassment also bear the burden of
not being believed.85 Women who claim that clergy have engaged in sexual
misconduct bear a similar burden. The women bringing claims of clergy
malpractice often lack credibility; the clergy, in contrast, has enormous
credibility. This imbalance frequently prevents victims from coming
forward.
86
Each of these examples of injustice against women serves as a backdrop
for another example of women receiving short shrift in the churches and
courts: the reluctance to recognize the problem of clergy sexual misconduct as
one worthy of a remedy.
III. CLERGY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
A. Churches Respond to Problem
The magnitude of the clergy sexual abuse epidemic is no secret in the
public press or in recent surveys of clergy. Surveys consistently show that
between ten and thirty-eight percent of clerical respondents report some level
of sexual contact with a congregant8 7 The pervasiveness of the problem is
83. In the case of Senator Packwood, the first charges were made three years before his
resignation. See Christine Gonzalez & Roger 0. Crockett, Gender in the Workplace After
Packwood, Companies Relocate with Awareness, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 9, 1995, at C7.
Senator Packwood had vowed to fight the charges and only after pressure from within the
Republican party, for reasons which had little to do with the clear merits of the women's case,
was he forced to resign. Id.
84. See MAcKINNON, supra note 77, at 83-90.
85. See id.
86. FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 82, 104-05.
87. Surveys of 300 clergy from four U.S. Christian denominations (Assemblies of God,
Episcopal Church U.S.A., Presbyterian Church U.S.A., and United Methodist), reported that 38%
admitted to some form of sexual contact with a member of their congregation, and 12% admitted
to having sexual intercourse with a congregant. An astonishing 76% said they knew of another
clergy member who had engaged in sexual intercourse with a congregant. Alison Mayes, Crossing
the Line, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 19, 1992, at 14; see also Eric Frazier, Churches are Seeking
Ways to Curb Clerical Misconduct, POST & COURIER, Dec. 11, 1994, at F9; Mike Wilson, The
Wrong Kind of Relationship, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 17, 1995, at ID. A mail survey of 80
pastors, conducted by the Center for Ethics and Social Policy of the Graduate Theological Union
in Berkeley, revealed that approximately 10% of the respondents admitted to having a sexual
relationship with a church member. David Briggs, Churches Become More Aware of Sexual
Misconduct by Clergy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1990, at F14. Furthermore, according to another
Christian magazine survey, one in ten pastors (12%) admitted to having sexual affairs outside their
marriages; one in five (18%) admitted to some form of sexual contact with someone other than
spouses. Id. The majority (69%) became involved with congregants, church staff or counselees. Id.
Although the high-profile cases have involved children, the majority of cases reported to the
[Vol. 74:1
19961 CLERGY MALPRACTICE REVISITED 15
just being recognized by the church hierarchy.8" Reports from other countries
confirm that this problem is not unique to the United States or to Christianity
but, rather, transcends denominational and geographic boundaries. 9
Reports of sexual improprieties and litigation have had a severe financial
impact on churches, and have led to questioning of their moral authority." In
response, many churches have begun to develop policies to deal with sex
abuse by clergy." This contrasts with the initial response of churches--one
Baptist Union of Western Canada, in Calgary, involve adults. Kim Lunman, Adults Suffering Bulk
of Sexual Abuse, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 24, 1994, at A8. Sexual involvement by female
ministers with male counselees is rare; the majority of cases reported in the United Church in
Edmonton involved female victims. Id. A policy report of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
reported that "between 10 and 23 percent of clergy nationwide have engaged in sexualized
behavior or sexual contact with parishioners, clients or employees ... within a professional
relationship." Presbyterians Adopt Guidelines to Curb Sex Misconduct by Clergy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1991, at A20. According to A.W. Richard Sipe, a Baltimore psychotherapist and former
priest who has studied the sexual activities of the clergy since 1960, at any one time 20% of
Roman Catholic priests are involved in sexual relationships with women. Joanne Wojcik, Church
Scandals Prompt Action; Risk Management Strategies Adopted by Several Dioceses, BUS. INS.,
Jan. 3, 1994, at 1. A study released in 1990 by the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health,
Faith and Ethics, in Chicago, claimed that one in every ten clergy has had an affair, while one in
four has had sexual contact with members of the congregation. John Dart, Churches Move Toward
Reducing Sexual Misconduct by Clergy, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1991, at F18. Twelve percent of
300 ministers surveyed by Christianity Today magazine admitted to committing adultery. Of
those, 39% admitted to such behavior with a church member, 17% with a person being counseled,
and 13% with a staff member. White, supra note 19, at E6.
88. Briggs, supra note 87, at F14.
89. Documented reports of clergy sexual misconduct come from all four comers of the
globe, and transect all religions. See, e.g., Bob Harvey, Harassment in Church; Various
Denominations Come to Grips with Growing Crisis, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 13, 1991, at EIO
(describing a survey of female clergy and female students in theological colleges within the
United Church in Canada which revealed that about a third of them reported experiencing sexual
harassment within the church). Lee S. Hua, Sex-scandal Monk Quits, But Insists He is Innocent,
STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at 21 (describing the scandalous sexual behavior of Buddhist monk
Phra Yantra Amaro Bhikku, that "prompted a near crisis of faith in Buddhist Thailand"); Tim
McGirk, All Kinds of Monkey Business, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 12, 1995, at 18, 19;
Kevin Myers, The Face Behind Ireland's Turmoil, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 17,
1994, at 17 (documenting the "sex abuse crisis" in the Catholic Church in Ireland); Michael
Rotem, Rabbi Starts 6 Months in Jail for Sex Abuse, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 1, 1991, at 02
(documenting a rabbi convicted of committing obscene sexual acts, fraud, and breach of trust after
molesting a woman during counseling related to an alimony matter); David Ward, Churchgoers
"Betrayed" by Rave Vicar, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 24, 1995, at 005 (documenting the rise and
fall of British "rave" vicar Chris Brain, who is alleged to have sexually abused more than 20
women during healing sessions at Brain's home). More than 25% of female students at a
Mennonite bible college in Winnipeg reported sexual abuse within the church during the previous
year, ranging from fondling to forced sex. Harvey, Harassment in Church, at E10; see also
Misconduct Will Join Any Denomination, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 24, 1992, at A]3 (stating that
the Rev. Marie Fortune, after examining over 700 cases of clergy sexual abuse, has found no
denominational pattern).
90. One journalist estimates that the Roman Catholic Church paid more than a half billion
dollars in medical and legal costs from 1982 to 1992. Carol McGraw, Casualties Abound When
Priests Stand Accused, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 24, 1994, at A01. A study conducted for the
National Conference of Bishops in 1984 estimated that litigation could eventually cost $1 billion.
Id.
91. John D. Vogelsang, Reconstructing the Response to Clergy Sexual Abuse, Q. REv. 3-10
(Winter 1993). Vogelsang identifies five models used by church officials to understand and
respond to sexual abuse within the church: the first model sees abuse as "sexual sin"; the second
views it as the act of a disturbed individual, a sociopath, or sexual addict; the third is the
therapeutic model, with both complainant and accused categorized as products of dysfunctional
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of denial and attacking the accusers in an attempt to avoid a scandal.92 The
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) General Assembly adopted guidelines in 1991
for use in the national office and as a model for individual presbyteries." The
United Methodist Church is training bishops, pastors, and district
superintendents to deal with cases of sexual abuse and avoid sexual
harassment.94 The North Georgia Conference of the United Methodist
Church's Pastoral Care Symposium, held in November of 1993, focused on
"sexuality and the ministry," and the North and South Georgia conferences
have held crisis management workshops, which included discussion of the
clergy's sexual transgressions with parishioners.95 Reform Jewish rabbis
added new warnings against even the "appearance of sexual impropriety" to
their revised code of ethics at a June 1991 meeting in Florida.'
In the Roman Catholic Church, celibacy is an integral aspect of the
priesthood, yet, there are estimates that at least fifty percent of the clergy are
not celibate at any given time.97 The Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapo-
lis has promulgated a policy on sexual misconduct by the clergy and church
employees, which is explained in a videotape and booklet sent to every Roman
Catholic household in the Archdiocese.98 The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
families; the fourth sees the clergy as having betrayed a professional relationship; and the fifth
subscribes to the theory that sexual abuse in the clergy/congregant relationship is a "manifestation
of the culturally condoned abuse of power and sexuality perpetrated by men on women and
children." Id.
92. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
93. Presbyterians Adopt Guidelines to Curb Sex Misconduct by Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1991, at A20. General Assembly guidelines include a definition of misconduct, theological
and ethical reflection, guidelines for adjudicating cases, responses to victims and congregations,
employment and reporting procedures, description of a sexual misconduct response team, and
sample complaint-processing documents. Thomas S. Giles, Coping with Sexual Misconduct in the
Church, CHRIsTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 11, 1993, at 48.
94. Stuart Vincent, Policy on Sex Abuse Complaints, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1994, at 39; see
also Virginia Culver, Methodists to Form Sex Conduct Team, DENVER POST, June 7, 1994, at B-
01 (discussing efforts of the Regional United Methodists to form "intervention and response"
teams).
95. Celia Sibley, Churches Forging Policies on Clergy Sexual Misconduct, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 18, 1993, at A15.
96. Dart, supra, note 87, at F18.
97. Kay Longcope, Sex Cases Put Celibacy Back in Spotlight, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30,
1992, at 1. A. W. Richard Sipe, a psychologist from Johns Hopkins University, conducted a 25-
year study which was released in 1990, and which revealed rates of celibacy in the church. Id.
Sipe, a former Benedictine monk, estimates that more than half of the 53,000 Roman Catholic
priests in the United States are breaking their vow of celibacy. Of those, about 28% are engaged
in long term relationships with women, while 10-13% are involved with men. He estimates that
nearly six percent are involved with adolescents-usually boys. Critics of Dr. Sipes point out that
many of the clergy interviewed for his study were already in therapy, so that the claimed
percentages are skewed and not representative of "typical" clergy. See Anastasia Toufexis, What to
do When Priests Stray, TIME, Sept. 24, 1990, at 79.
98. Martha Sawyer Allen, Archdiocese Expands Its Policy on Sexual Misconduct; Document
Will Go to All Catholics, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1992, at ]A. The video includes vignettes
showing appropriate and inappropriate behavior, and provides information to the viewer regarding
reporting instances of abuse. Id. The policy includes performing background checks on all of the
Church's 4,000 employees, as well as providing an "advocate" system to facilitate the reporting of
incidents of abuse. Id. Additionally, the policy clearly defines "sexual harassment," "exploitation,"
and "abuse" so as to provide a sense of clarity on appropriate boundaries and behaviors. Id. The
Twin Cities archdiocese has been considered a leader within the church on this issue, as they have
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Chicago has instituted a toll-free hot line and an independent panel composed
of laymen to handle complaints of sexual abuse by priests. 99 The Roman
Catholic Diocese of Joliet added lay people to the investigating team in order
to address the suspicion that church! officials probing sexual misconduct by
clergy cover up the truth.' °° Two Roman Catholic dioceses in Ohio depend
on police checks to look into the backgrounds of priests and lay workers."
Recently, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sacramento released its procedures
for handling sexual misconduct of its employees, to be made available to
anyone who wants a copy." The Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh has
established a policy to deal with sexual misconduct of clerics. 3 The policy
creates a comprehensive administrative process under which an assessment
board consisting of laity and priests evaluates the credibility of an accusation,
and recommends to the bishop the retention or dismissal of the accused. It
encourages victims to report the alleged abuse to the proper civil
authorities." 4 The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York has instituted a
similar policy of advising all complainants that any issues may be reported to
legal authorities. 5 The New Mexico Archdiocese established a four-step risk
management program and installed a toll-free line for victims to call to
register confidential complaints."° It also formed a lay commission which
includes non-Catholics, a victim, the parent of a victim, and several therapists,
to investigate past, present, and future claims of clergy misconduct. °"
Episcopal dioceses in New England require priests to fill out background
questionnaires." Religious leaders hope the checks will restore confidence
in the church." Some insurance companies are requiring these measures
before giving churches coverage for sexual misconduct."' The Episcopal
had a policy on sexual abuse since 1988. Id. However, in 1990, a jury awarded $2 million (later
reduced in remittitur) to one of the victims of Thomas Adamson, a former priest in the
archdiocese who was accused in the early 1980s of abusing at least six boys while he was a priest
in the 1970s. Id. This has been an expensive lesson for the archdiocese, not only in terms of
money, but also resulting in a tamished public image.
99. Larry Witham, Sex Scandals Lead Churches to Reassess Their Counseling Role, WASH.
TMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at A5; see also Archdiocese Issues Report on Sexual Abuse by Priests,
REUTERS (North American Wire), June 15, 1992 (outlining the recommendations of Chicago
archdiocese, including an independent nine-member review board consisting in part of laypersons,
a professional caseworker to deal with all allegations of sexual misconduct, and a mandatory
program of intensive and continuing therapy for guilty priests).
100. Andrew Herrmann, Diocese to Add Laity in Sex Abuse Probes, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1993, at 14; see also Archdiocese Issues Report on Sexual Abuse by Priests, supra note
99.
101. Bill Lindelof, Churches Screen Clergy for Scandal, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11, 1995, at
BI.
102. Diocese Formulates Sex Policy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 3, 1995, at B1.
103. Diocese Revises Policy on Sexual Abuse by Clergy, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 11, 1993.
104. Id.
105. An advisory board composed of four priests and eight lay people with backgrounds in
psychiatry, social work, law, and communications will review overall policy and procedures. Peter
Steinfels, Policy is Issued on Investigating Abuse by Priests, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1993, at Al.
106. Wojcik, supra note 87, at 1.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., PriestrUndergo Background Checks, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 1995, at
1A.
109. See, e.g., id.
110. Background Checks Extended to Clergy, PHOENIX GAZETrE, Aug. 8, 1995, at A2.
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Diocese of Southwest Florida, in 1994, issued a written policy on sexual
misconduct. The thirty-three-page document gives plain-spoken advice to
priests who counsel parishioners."' The Diocese of Long Island has
developed guidelines for churches within the diocese."2 In Minnesota, a
statewide interfaith committee has been developed to deal with sexual exploi-
tation by clergy.' Furthermore, in 1994, the Episcopal Church's General
Convention passed strict new procedures for the trial and discipline of clerics
accused of misconduct."' Some Lutheran churches are also doing back-
ground checks on new pastors and requiring ministers to attend seminars on
sexual harassment."5 The North Carolina Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church has begun "study days" for church leaders, geared toward prevention
of misconduct and toward helping clergy learn to take care of themselves."6
The Christian Reformed Church, Church of the Brethren, and Mennonite
Brethren, and United States Conference have adopted similar policies."' The
Mennonite Church, Congregation Leadership Office, has published guidelines
for disciplining clergy for sexual and other transgressions."' Southern
Baptists are beginning to keep records on clerics' sexual improprieties, on
moral grounds and because of possible litigation.' "'
Among the questions being asked are:
(i) Have you ever been charged or adjudicated with sexual misconduct?
(ii) Do you have a history of drug abuse?
(iii) Have you ever been charged with misappropriating funds?
Id. The responses are then forwarded to a Minnesota records company, which then verifies them
with the references the ministers also are asked to provide. Id.
111. Wilson, supra note 87. The plain-speaking manual includes advice on ways to minimize
the risk inherent in private meetings: "One seasoned priest has a comer in the local Denny's to
meet certain people for coffee. The waitresses know how to make themselves scarce so a private
conversation can happen." Id. Additionally, the policy recommends that priests "should be prudent
about self-disclosure, especially around sexual or highly personal matters," because "it is easy for
people to misinterpret." Id. "Finally, the policy urges priests to 'use care when exchanging the
Peace'-in other words, hug someone only when it is clear that a hug is welcome." Id.
112. J. Michael Parker, Episcopalians Tighten Policy on Clergy Sexual Misconduct, SAN
ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Sept. 3, 1994, at 19A. Robert Royce of the Diocese of Long Island
characterized the changes, effective as of January 1, 1996, as having dragged the Episcopal
Church "kicking and screaming into the modem era." Id. The major focal point of change
involved eliminating the statute of limitations for charges of sexual abuse of people under the age
of 21. Id. The revisions also increase the period available to file suit for those over the age of 21.
Jim W. Jones, Episcopal Misconduct Code Revised, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 1, 1994,
at 6. Revisions also state guidelines on who has standing to file a complaint, including the victim,
the victim's spouse, the victim's parents, and groups of clergy. Id. Additionally, the position of
"church advocate" is created, whose role is to aid the victim in interpreting the church's
disciplinary process. Id.
113. See Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48.
114. Clergy Discipline Procedures Revised, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 3, 1994, at D9.
115. Wendy Hundley, Churches Eye Ways to Deal With Clergy Misconduct, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 3, 1994, at 6C.
116. Flo Johnston, Sexual Crimes by Clergy Addressed-Lutherans Adopt Procedures,
Policies, DURHAM HERALD-SUN, July 2, 1994, at Cl.
117. Giles, supra note 93, at 48.
118. MENNONITE BOARD OF CONGREGATIONAL MINISTRIES, GUIDELINES FOR DIsCIPLINE
REGARDING MINISTERIAL CREDENTIALS (2d ed. 1993).
119. Sibley, supra note 95, at AI5.
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Reverend Marie Fortune, an expert in the prevention of sexual and
domestic violence, conducts workshops for clergy on sexual misconduct. 2
She sees the counseling relationship as fraught with potential dangers. She
recommends written policies that spell out the professional conduct expected
of clergy and the consequences of violating the agreement. 2' Priests engaged
in long-term counseling should be supervised and held professionally
accountable in a manner similar to psychologists, social workers, and
doctors.'22 Some large denominations have instituted rules regarding the
counseling situation, such as recommending ministers counsel a person only
three times, and that all counseling be done during working. hours at the
church.'23 Other safeguards include making sure there is a window in the
counseling room, and some have gone as far as to ban all opposite-sex
counseling. 24
Often, however, the church is unwilling or unable to address this problem
because of its own shortcomings. In Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,2 ' church
fathers tried to silence the victim to preserve the integrity of the "old boy
network" and the reputation of a minister who was considered "bishop
material."'26 In many instances, priests who had committed sexual abuse
returned from brief rehabilitation sessions to other parishes whose parishioners
were not aware of their histories. 2 ' If a minister embezzled money from his
church, it is unlikely that the hierarchy would recommend him to another
church, yet, as Moses illustrates, there are routine "cover-ups" of actions
viewed as mere sexual peccadillos. The interests of the woman should not be
subordinate to the interests of the church in protecting the priest engaged in
the misconduct.
B. Judicial Treatment of Clergy Malpractice Claims
The seminal case of clergy malpractice is Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley. 2 ' The facts of Nally are very different from the cases
discussed in this article. Nally involved a wrongful death action filed against
the church and its pastors by the parents of a young man who committed
suicide after receiving informal counseling from the church.'29 The plaintiffs
asserted that the defendants were negligent in failing to prevent the suicide,
and had engaged in outrageous conduct. 30 The defendants claimed that as
pastoral counselors, not professional, medical or psychiatric counselors, no
120. See FORTUNE, IS NoTHING SACRED, supra note 5.
121. See id. at 135-153.
122. Mayes, supra note 87, at 14.
123. Virginia Culver, Sex Lawsuits Force Changes in Churches, DENVER POST, May 1, 1994,
at A-01.
124. Id.
125. 863 P.2d 310, 316 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
126. Moses, 863 P.2d at 42.
127. See Culver, supra note 123.
128. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
129. Nally, 763 P.2d at 950-51.
130. Id. at 952-53.
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duty was owed to the plaintiff. 3' The court correctly declined to impose a
duty to refer difficult cases to professional counselors on the defendants,
allegedly fearful of stifling all gratuitous or religious counseling.'32 Although
many courts have addressed the question of whether a separate cause of action
exists for the malpractice of a member of the clergy while acting in a clerical
capacity, no court has allowed recovery under this theory.'33 Some courts
have held that the tort of clergy malpractice does not exist, 3 4 while others
have found that no clergy malpractice had been committed under the specific
facts of the case.'35 After Nally, claims against clergy for sexual misconduct
and negligent counseling steadily increased.'36 Furthermore, as churches
nationwide become more involved in the personal, spiritual and psychological
lives of parishioners, and more clergy provide pastoral counseling, these
claims are expected to multiply.'37
131. Id. at 950.
132. The Nally court considered these barriers under the heading of "public policy con-
siderations." Id. at 959. Specifically, the court stated:
Imposing a duty on defendants or other nontherapist counselors to... insure their
counselees [are also] under the care of psychotherapists, psychiatric facilities, or others
authorized and equipped to forestall imminent suicide, could have a deleterious effect on
counseling in general.... [T]he indeterminate nature of liability ... could deter those
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that their private disclosures
could subject them to involuntary commitment to psychiatric facilities.
Id. at 960. The Nally Court also saw constitutional barriers to the imposition of liability:
Because of the differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in our
state and practiced by church members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite
possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors. Such a duty
would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular
denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.
Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Kaufman discounted both "public policy" concerns. Specifically,
as to the constitutional objections, he found that the compelling state interest in preserving the
lives of would-be suicides justified sanctioning tort recovery for non-religiously motivated actions
that occur within the scope of a pastoral counseling relationship. Id. at 969-70. "'Good faith and
reasonable conduct are the necessary touchstones to any qualified [First Amendment] privilege
that may arise from any invited and religiously directed family counseling, assistance, or advice."'
Id. at 970 (quoting Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137 (Cal. 1966)).
133. Destefano v. Gabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 n.l1 (Colo. 1988); see also Handley v.
Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993),
cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb.
1993); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio
1988). Several courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice. See Isely
v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Fontaine v. Roman Catholic Church, 625
So. 2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Jones v.
Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984). But
see Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (recognizing a
cause of action in malpractice against a cleric acting in the capacity of a marriage counselor);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Harvey, 887 F. Supp. 195 (C.D. I11. 1995).
134. John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Cause of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R.4th
752, 753-54 (1990).
135. Id. at 754-55; Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239; Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 551; Byrd, 565 N.E.2d
at 587.
136. Fain, supra note 10, at 99.
137. Id. Pastoral counseling has been described as "the use by clergy of counseling and
psychotherapeutic methods to enable individuals, couples, and families to handle constructively
their personal crises and problems in living. Pastoral counseling draws on insights from
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1. Clergy Sexual Misconduct as An Amatory Action
Cases like Nally are difficult ones, since questions concerning the content
of the counseling pose constitutional problems, in particular the First
Amendment Religion Clause, Establishment Clause, and free speech concerns.
Nally, however, is not the typical case; far more common are cases alleging
sexual misconduct. A plethora of cases are filed by men 3 ' who allege that
the defendant pastor developed a sexual and romantic relationship with the
plaintiff's wife during marital counseling. Strock v. Pressnell'39 is typical of
cases involving husband plaintiffs. Courts frequently dismiss these cases as
amatory actigns'" which are barred by statute.'4' In Strock v Pressnell, for
example, the court refused to recognize the tort of clergy malpractice under
the facts given, because the "alleged acts of Pressnell fell within the realm of
intentional tort law, i.e., amatory actions-not malpractice."' 42 The Strock
court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as an attempt to circumvent the ban on
amatory actions, and held that no legal right existed. "Indeed, a fundamental
principle of the law of all torts is that a legal right must exist and that this
right must be violated in order to warrant redress."'43 The Strock court also
contemporary understanding of human personality, therapeutic methods from current counseling
approaches, and scriptural and theological resources." Id. at 103-04 (quoting Patrick 1. Shea, Con-
stitutional Issues Involved in Regulation of Spiritual Counseling and the Duty to Train, 1990 ABA
TORT AND RELIGION 1F4).
138. See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1996); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763
P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Roppollo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Greene v. Roy,
604 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993); Byrd v. Faber, 565
N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla.
1993).
139. 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988). A husband brought suit against a minister of the Lutheran
Church for clergy malpractice, breach of a fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1236. The church was also a
defendant based on agency principles, and claims of negligent supervision and training of
Pressnell. Id.
140. The group of actions termed amatory actions includes criminal conversation, seduction,
alienation of affection, and breach of promise to marry. See infra notes 150-76 and accompanying
texL
141. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
601 (1995); OI-o REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Anderson 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220
(Michie 1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977).
142. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239. "For clergy malpractice to be recognized, the cleric's
behavior ... must fall outside the scope of other recognized torts. It is clear.., that clergy
malpractice is distinct from an intentional tort, since the latter claims are currently actionable
against clergymen regardless of their 'professional nature."' Id. (citations omitted). The Ohio
Supreme Court left open, however, the possibility of maintaining an action for clergy malpractice
with the suitable facts. "This opinion should not be read as precluding an action, against a
counselor, pastoral or otherwise, in which a counselor is negligent in treating a patient. This
opinion is limited to the narrow holding that clergy malpractice is not a viable cause of action
under the facts of this case." Id. at 1240 n.5. "Moreover, we are unaware of any authority
supporting the proposition that sexual abuse by a member of the clergy is cognizable as 'clergy
malpractice."' Id. The court also ruled on the constitutionality of an Ohio statute which abolished
amatory actions, stating that it does not violate the Ohio Constitution or the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.; see also
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("'[Olnce intentional offensive
conduct has been established, the actor is liable for assault and not negligence."') (quoting
Mazzaferro v. Albany Motel Enters., 515 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
143. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1243. The Strock court stated:
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relied on the view that in order to recognize a cause of action for clergy
malpractice, the cleric's behavior must fall outside the scope of other
recognized torts.'" Because Strock's injury resembled an amatory injury, the
court ignored his allegation that the breach of trust had caused immeasurable
damage to his marriage relations and his personal psyche. 45 The Ohio
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's order granting the defendants'
motion to dismiss)46
The Strock plaintiff's damage and the violation alleged were not a "heart
balm," 47 despite the court's view." It was a breach of trust by a clerical
counselor who had been expected to act in the best interests of his
clients-both wife and husband. The Strock court missed an opportunity to set
important public policy. The question before it was not one of moral
relativism, nor was it an issue of disgrace visited upon the family. The
imposition of civil liability would have a deterrent effect on this type of
relationship, which is abusive and manipulative, rather than a matter of the
heart. Whether the behavior results in harm to the husband or the wife, the
plaintiff should be able to recover against the cleric for the misconduct.
Courts have followed a policy of dismissing many actions brought by
wives or husbands who began counseling with a priest who subsequently
engaged in a sexual relationship with the wife.'49 Courts rejecting these
claims are usually relying on the abolition of amatory action torts such as
criminal conversation, 0  seduction, 5' alienation of affection,'52  and
Because OHIO R.C. 2305.29 abolished the torts of alienation of affections and criminal
conversation, any legal right that a spouse may have had under these common law
actions has been abrogated and, thus, there can be no violation of a nonexistent right.
Therefore, [the defendant] is not liable for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or nondisclosure.
Id. at 1244. It is unclear why the court focused on the instrumentality of the injury rather than the
specific duties and rights being violated.
144. Id. at 1239; see also Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ohio 1991) (expressing
concern that "through the creative use of tort law, appellees may recover several times for the
same injury"); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. App. 1987) (stating that "to avoid a
redundant remedy, . . . any functional theory of clergy malpractice needs [to] address incidents of
the clergy-communicant relationship not already actionable").
145. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239-42.
146. Id. at 1244.
147. Id. at 1242.
148. "In fact, the special relationship existing between Pressnell and appellant in the instant
action is what distinguishes this case from a common amatory action." Id. at 1246 (Sweeney, J.,
dissenting). In his well reasoned contrast between amatory actions and breach of fiduciary duty,
Judge Sweeney noted:
Here, the couple's minister, under guise of offering pastoral counseling services, abused
the trust placed in him. This trust was the raison d'etre of the relationship. It is also
what distinguishes this case from those which the legislature intended to abolish when it
did away with amatory actions. This distinction also applies to Strock's claim of
misrepresentation-this was not your average lover's ruse.
id. at 1246 (quoting Strock v. Presnell, Nos. 4127, 4146, 1987 WL 14434, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 15, 1987) (Cacioppo, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result)).
149. See, e.g., Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (Maddox, J., concurring;
majority affirming dismissal on unstated grounds); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct.
App. 1994); Greene v. Roy, 604 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Strock v. Presnell, 527 N.E.2d
1235 (Ohio 1988); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993).
150. Criminal conversation is essentially defined as the sexual intercourse of an outsider with
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breach of a promise to marry. "'53 The courts have, in effect, abolished torts
where the injury incidentally or expressly involves a sexual act. One of the
concerns expressed is that this is a "slippery slope," where liability based on
sexual misconduct will lead to the establishment of liability in the Nally-type
case."" This emphasis is misplaced. The courts should not be concerned with
the sexual nature of the act, but with whether the act involved a breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by the pastor toward his parishioner.'55 That misconduct
is the gravamen of the clergy malpractice claim.
The rationale behind the amatory torts was that one's affection was a
property interest, the loss of which had a pecuniary value recoverable under
tort law.'56 Some have speculated that the laws "developed ... as an
offshoot of the action for enticing away a servant and depriving the master of
the quasi-proprietary interest in her services."'57  Eventually parents,
employers, or spouses could all sue for seduction, assuming that the "seducee"
had previously been chaste and of some service to the plaintiff.' At early
a husband or wife. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 373 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court apparently
felt strongly about the importance of the action when it stated:
Many of the cases hold that the essential injury to the husband consists in the defilement
of the marriage bed, in the invasion of his exclusive right to marital intercourse with his
wife and to beget his own children. This is a right of the highest kind, upon the
thorough maintenance of which the whole social order rests, and in order to the
maintenance of the action it may properly be regarded as a property right.
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 484 (1904).
151. "Seduction [is] 'the act of persuading or inducing a woman of previous chaste character
to depart from the path of virtue by the use of any species of arts, persuasions, or wiles which are
calculated to have, and do have, that effect and resulting in her ultimately submitting .... to the
sexual embraces of the person accused."' Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980) (quoting Savage v. Embrey, 184 N.W. 503, 505 (Mich. 1921)); see also Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Weinlich v. Coffee, 176 P. 210 (Colo. 1919)
("Seduction is 'the act of a man in enticing a woman to have unlawful intercourse with him by
means of persuasion, solicitation, promise, bribes, or other means without the employment of
force.,')).
152. This tort involves an adulterer encouraging a spouse to leave the plaintiff, and is a step
removed from "criminal conversation." See Destefano, 763 P.2d at 279 & n.3.
153. Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (Wash. 1977). That court described the cause of
action:
The breach-of-promise-to-marry action is one not easy to classify. Although the action is
treated as arising from the breach of a contract ... , the damages allowable ...
resemble a tort action. Thus, ... [one can] recover for loss to reputation, mental
anguish, and injury to health, in addition to recovering for expenditures made in prepara-
tion for the marriage and loss of pecuniary and social advantages which the promised
marriage offered.
Id.
154. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
155. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's
dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty claim because it "was simply an elliptical way to state a
clergy malpractice claim, a cause of action that it had already held to be not recognized in
Illinois").
156. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at
915-16 (5th ed. 1984).
157. Id.; see also Magierowski v. Buckley, 121 A.2d 749, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1956) ("The wife and minor children were considered, in early common law, as superior servants
of the husband and father ... ").
158. The theory of recovery for all groups originated in the tort of "enticement," a common
law reformulation of the ancient doctrine of "per quad servitium amisit." See Cravens/Povock Ins.
Agency v. Beasley Constr., 766 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Francis Bowes
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common law, a seduced female did not have a cause of action against her
seducer because she was also engaged in the wrongful act, and because loss of
service was indispensable to the plaintiff's right of recovery, based upon the
relation of master to servant.'59 Later, the seducee herself got the statutory
right to sue for the seduction, although the action was limited to unmarried
females."
States eventually began to pass statutes to abolish these common-law
amatory actions. In many states, the legislative intent was to limit the abuses
generated by a plaintiff using the cause of action for extortion purposes,'
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663, 663 (1923)).
This remedy originated in early Roman law when children, servants, and slaves were so
closely identified with the domestic head of the house that an injury to them gave rise to
an action by the pater familias, the male head of the house, who alone was entitled to
recover for these damages.
Id. at 310. So scarce was labor during and after the Black Death in Europe, that a statutory right
was created for. employers allowing recovery for servants "enticed" away from their employment.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 129 at 980.
The same "loss of services" rationale extended the cause of action to fathers, allowing them
to sue their daughters' seducers for the loss of the daughters' services. For an excellent description
of the evolution of the tort of seduction, see Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They
Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374
(1993). Ms. Larson points out that as the nineteenth century passed, daughters no longer possessed
the same pecuniary interest for their fathers. "Urbanization and expanding wage labor
opportunities took young women outside the home to work, eroding fathers' control over their
daughters' activities. Many unmarried women gained unprecedented personal and economic
independence by taking work in factories and domestic service, and some began to live apart from
their families before marriage." Id. at 384.
159. Weinlich v. Coffee, 176 P. 210, 211 (Colo. 1919). In denying the plaintiff's action for
seduction, the court stated:
At common law a seduced female has no cause of action against her seducer, not only
because she is a party to the wrongful act, but also because loss of service is
indispensable to a right of recovery, and no one except those entitled to the services of
the female can maintain an action for the seduction; the right of action being based
solely upon the relation of master and servant.
Id. See also Welsund v. Schueller, 108 N.W. 483, 484 (Minn. 1906); Oberlin v. Upson, 95 N.E.
511, 512 (Ohio 1911). Even after statutes were passed allowing married women to sue in their
own right (the Married Women's Acts), courts went to extremes to deny recovery to women for
the alienation of their spouses' affection. Consider the following statement by the court in Duffies
v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 525 (Wis. 1890), in justifying denial of recovery to the wife:
There are natural and unchangeable conditions of husband and wife that make that right
radically unequal and different... . [The wife] is purer and better by nature than her
husband and more governed by principle and a sense of duty and right, and she seldom
violates her marriage obligations, or abandons her home, or denies to her husband the
comforts and advantages of her society by any inducement or influence of others,
without just cause. With the husband the case is different .... He is exposed to the
temptations, enticements, and allurements of the world, which easily withdraw him from
her society, or cause him to desert or abandon her .... The wife had reason to expect all
these things when she entered the marriage relation, and her right to his society has all
these conditions, and is not the same in "degree and value" as his rights to her.
Id. at 525.
160. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1988) (citing Weinlich v. Coffee, 176
P. 210, 211 (Colo. 1919)).
161. See Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ohio 1988). The court noted:
[lit is notorious that ... [amatory actions] have afforded a fertile field for blackmail and
extortion by means of manufactured suits in which the threat of publicity is used to
force a settlement. There is good reason to believe that even genuine actions of this type
are brought more frequently than not with purely mercenary or vindictive motives; that
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not a feminist aversion to "woman as property." The court in Strock
speculated that an "increased societal interest in personal choice, the
decriminalization of sexual activities in many states, and skepticism about the
role of law in protecting feelings and enforcing highly personal morality"
contributed to the passage of anti-heart balm statutes.'62
2. Beyond Amatory Torts
In a vigorous dissent in Strock v. Pressnell,'63 Justice Sweeney
contended that clerics should be held to the same duty of care as secular
counselors by focusing on the behavior of the practitioner and not his religious
or secular status.'" He also pointed out that both religious and secular
counselors would reject sexual relations as a viable treatment technique. 6'
He regarded "clergy malpractice" to be a misnomer, and would have held
"that a marriage counselor who engages in sexual relations with the spouse of
a client seeking professional guidance may be answerable in damages for
malpractice."'"
One of the distinct difficulties faced by claimants is showing that the
clergy malpractice claim is distinct from existing intentional tort and
negligence claims, and has not been thrown in as a "catch all" claim. 6
Justice Sweeney responded to the court's assertion that the tort of clergy
malpractice must fall entirely outside the scope of other defined torts:
[T]he counselor-client relationship is the basis of the cause of action.
It is because of this special relationship that liability results. The
standard of care applicable to the relationship exists irrespective of
any liability resulting from the negligent performance of acts arising
it is impossible to compensate for such damage which has derisively been called "heart
balm"; that people of any decent instincts do not bring an action which merely adds to
the family disgrace; and that no preventive purpose is served, since such torts are
seldom committed with deliberate plan.
Id. (quoting KEaTON ET AL., supra note 156, § 124, at 929 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 281 (Colo. 1988) (discussing the abuses perpetuated under alienation of
affection, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry claims, and declaring a
legislative intent that the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of
these statutes).
162. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1240.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1244.
165. Id. ("The method by which each would be qualified to perform his respective functions
is wholly immaterial .... since, in either situation, sexual relations have never been an accepted
mode of treatment.").
166. Id. at 1245.
167. Mark A. Anthony, Through the Narrow Door: An Examination of Possible Criteria for a
Clergy Malpractice Action, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 493, 493-94 (1990); see also Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("To avoid a redundant remedy .... any
functional theory of clergy malpractice needs [to] address incidents of the clergy-communicant
relationship not already actionable."). That is, the court would find that conduct fitting within
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with business
relationships, or obtaining donations of money by fraud, would be carved out of conduct
actionable for clergy malpractice.
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in a context unrelated to the fulfillment of professional
responsibilities."
Thus, Justice Sweeney hurdled an obstacle that other courts found
insurmountable: the foundation of the action is inextricable from the
environment in which the harm occurs. It does not matter that the minister's
acts, if committed privately, may historically have been amatory torts; 6
when a fiduciary or professional relationship exists and the fiduciary breaches
his duty, the law should provide protection, as it has traditionally done. A
minister who sleeps with a woman he is supposed to be counseling has abused
the trust placed in him. 7 ' He should be held accountable for that breach of
trust, whether by the husband whose marriage has been affected by the priest's
malpractice, or the victim herself.
The Svengali-like influence of a manipulative priest, in a position of
direct authority over the victim, does not permit an inference of a sexual
relationship between consenting adults. 7' Sex between equals is very
different from sexual contact between guardian and ward, yet the court in
Schmidt v. Bishop72 demonstrates the challenge faced by victims. Although
conceding that a fiduciary relationship was "one founded upon trust or
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another,"'
73
the Schmidt court failed to find a fiduciary relationship in a counseling
168. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1245.
169. It might also be argued that the amatory actions enumerated in the statutes are the only
ones abolished. See Destefano, 763 P.2d at 283, which stated:
In interpreting [the statute], we must give effect to the policy considerations enumerated
[therein], but should not read the statute so broadly as to preclude any cause of action
involving extramarital affairs, regardless of whether a claim for relief which is not
included in [the statute] is enumerated. In our view, the heart balm statute only
precludes those causes of action specifically listed in the statute.
Id.
170. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1246.
171. Some courts take the view that despite the plaintiff's claims of emotional vulnerability,
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a clergy was subject to demurrer,
because the actions involved conduct between "consenting adults." Schieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Neb. 1993). But cf F.G. v. McDonell, 677 A.2d 258 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1996) (noting that an allegation that a cleric had exploited vulnerabilities of adult
counselee and induced her to engage in sexual acts was sufficient to state a claim of clergy
malpractice).
172. 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Schmidt, the plaintiff alleged that when she was
12 years old, Joseph Bishop initiated sexual contact which "did not involve rape or sexual
intercourse, but... the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of New York
Penal Law § 130.60 ...." Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 324. He invoked God while sexually abusing
Ms. Schmidt, assuring her that "the relationship was special and acceptable in the eyes of the Lord
. .. Id. The counseling relationship and abuse continued for 28 years, and the plaintiff's
affidavit states that during psychotherapy she "began to understand that the contact with Joseph
Bishop was wrong, that he sexually abused [her] and that [she] suffered severe damage as a result
of that abuse." Id. The court rejected the view that engaging in sexual contact during the
counseling relationship amounted to malpractice, instead saying that it "clearly" supported an
action for battery or "some similar intentional tort for which the statute of limitations is one year."
Id. The court also asserted that "[e]ven if the court were to invite a trial jury to engage in the
Constitutionally dubious task of setting a standard of reasonable care for clergymen engaged in
counseling, the obstacle remains that New York courts have rejected uniformly such attempts to
transmogrify intentional torts into negligence." Id.
173. Id. at 325 (quoting Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)).
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relationship between the minister and plaintiff which began when she was
twelve years of age. The court refused to hold the minister to a fiduciary
standard, imposed as a matter of social policy; he had only a general duty not
to violate the law.1
74
In Roppolo v. Moore, 5 the counselee committed suicide, in part,
because of an adulterous affair she had with the defendant, a medical doctor
and an Episcopal priest, when he was counseling her. In dismissing the
woman's claim, the court stated:
As there is no civil nor criminal prohibition against such conduct
between adult laypersons, the State cannot penalize such conduct
because Dr. Moore was an Episcopal priest .... To do so would
require this Court to determine the standards of the Episcopal Church
and then put the weight of the State behind those standards or to
require a different standard of behavior of the clergy, neither of
which is permissible.'76
The Roppolo court failed to distinguish between the priest's negligence, which
is unrelated to his status as a priest, and his breach of a fiduciary duty which
is inextricable from that status. By invoking the First Amendment's
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, the court promoted a policy whereby
those who incidentally wear a collar may engage in civil wrongs without
redress, even if the conduct complained of is not religious. The Roppolo court,
like the court in Schmidt, 77 ignored the power exerted by a spiritual pastor
over a parishioner when it alluded to conduct between "adult laypersons."'78
Both courts failed to distinguish consenting adults from someone engaged in a
sexual relationship with a counselee. The courts must impose a fiduciary duty
on ministers to abstain from sexual relationships with their parishioners.
Further, this rule will put the bad actors among the profession on notice that,
as a representative of the church, abuse of the parishioner's trust will not be
tolerated. 1
79
When the church is not involved, the courts have less difficulty finding
liability for similar sexual misconduct. In Roy v. Hartogs,' the plaintiff
174. Id. at 325-26. The court so decided even though the plaintiff was sent to the defendant
for "emotional, spiritual and familial counseling." Id. at 324.
175. 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
176. Roppolo, 644 So. 2d at 208 (citation omitted).
177. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 325-26.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
179. Consider the argument of Judge Cacioppo, in her dissent in Strock v. Pressnell:
"Ironically, far from impeding religious liberty, allowing malpractice claims against prurient
pastoral counselors reinforces the Church's own religious doctrine .... Imposing societal
prohibitions of such conduct on a minister through the civil law does not restrict religious liberty,
but actually enhances it." Strock v. Presnell, Nos. 4127, 4146, 1987 WL 14434, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987), judgment affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom Strock v. Pressnell,
527 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ohio 1988) (rejecting, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty as a
viable cause of action)). Several courts have recognized breach of fiduciary duty in clergy sexual
misconduct cases. See Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994);
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
180. 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975).
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alleged that her psychiatrist had engaged in a sexual relationship with her
during a course of treatment.' Using consent as a defense, the defendant
moved to dismiss the claim because the amatory action of seduction is no
longer recognized as a valid cause of action. The court rejected that defense,
noting that:
It was never the intention of the legislature to outlaw all actions in
which sexual intercourse is an element .... [Wihere consent could
not be given or where it was coerced as in cases of statutory rape,
rape or where there was a fiduciary relationship between guardian and
ward, there was always an action for damages on the case." 2
Using the analogy of guardian and ward, the court determined that the consent
of a vulnerable patient given to a psychiatrist, who is in the position of "over-
powering influence and trust," is not a bar to the cause of action.'83 The
breach of the fiduciary is unrelated to the "consent" of the ward. 84 The Roy
court heralded a public policy rationale for the recognition of a cause of action
for malpractice.8 5 There can be no consent8 6 when the victim holds the
person making the advances in such high esteem that she would be willing to
do anything. Charismatic leaders such as Jim Jones in Jonestown, Guyana,'87
and David Koresh in Waco, Texas,'88 are extreme examples of the loss of
will and the level of dedication that a religious leader can inspire.
C. Holding Churches Liable
The courts must balance claims alleging inappropriate behavior by clerics
against the church's vulnerability from its detractors and unscrupulous persons.
Admittedly, the church is a deep pocket, and many clergy are unable to pay
large damage awards; so, some plaintiffs seek to hold the hierarchical church
liable on the basis of vicarious liability, negligent hiring, or negligent supervi-
sion of the offending clergyman.
Torts committed within the scope of employment may create vicarious
liability. This imputed negligence or respondeat superior liability results from
the nature of the relationship between the clergy and the church. The church,
181. Roy, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
182. Id. at 299 (quotations omitted).
183. Id. at 300-01.
184. Id. at 299.
185. The New York court stated:
There is a public policy to protect a patient from the deliberate and malicious abuse of
power and breach of trust by a psychiatrist when that patient entrusts to him her body
and mind in the hope that he will use his best efforts to effect a cure. That right is best
protected by permitting the victim to pursue civil remedies, not only to vindicate a
wrong against her, but to vindicate the public interest as well.
Id. at 301.
186. Authentic consent "must take place in a context of mutuality, choice, full knowledge,
and equal power, and in the absence of coercion or fear. When there is an imbalance of power in
a relationship, these necessary factors will not be present." FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra
note 5, at 38.




as master, has control over the actions of the servant, because the master has
selected and trained the servant and should therefore be responsible for his
wrongs.8 9 This allocation of risk supposes that the employer who benefits
from the enterprise is in a better position to bear the loss than the innocent
victim."
Primarily in response to demands of insurance companies, churches
became concerned about the imposition of vicarious liability. 9 ' As a
threshold requirement for holding churches. liable, the clerics must be found
liable. Some commentators have argued potential liability under agency
theory since "churches represent their clergy as standing in a special
relationship to God."'93 In order to impose respondeat superior liability, the
employee must be viewed as a servant, under the control of the master, but
since most churches do not control the day-to-day activities of clergy, liability
should be avoidable. Besides, engaging in sexual activity with a counselee can
never be viewed as falling within the scope of the priest's employment, so
churches should be able to escape liability on that basis.'94
In addition, the public policy reasons for imposing vicarious liability do
not exist in this realm. Recognizing that churches are not-for-profit entities
that provide free counseling to needy clients, courts may be reluctant to
impose liability, fearing that churches may no longer engage in gratuitous
counseling of parishioners. In private industry, liability was imposed as a
189. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 327.
190. KEETON Er AL, supra note 156, § 69, at 500-01.
191. The Very Reverend Lloyd A. Lewis, Jr., Dean of the George Mercer, Jr. Memorial
School of Theology, expressed grave concerns about the Episcopal diocese's reason for embarking
on an educational campaign for clergy, deacons, and lay church employees around the issue of
sexual misconduct. The Church Insurance Fund mandated that churches and church organizations
participate in diocesan-run training in order to be indemnified in suits for sexual harassment, child
sexual abuse, or other sexual misconduct. As a result, the diocese embarked upon the training.
Dean Lewis stated that the essential nature of the Christian community is non-exploitive and this
should serve as an impetus for such training, not legal and financial threats. Interview with The
Very Rev. Lloyd A. Lewis, Jr., Dean of the George Mercer, Jr. Memorial Sch. of Theology, in
Garden City, Long Island, N.Y. (June 24, 1996). Although the availability of insurance is an
important issue in the resolution of whether clergy or their churches should be held liable for
clergy's sexual misconduct, this discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
192. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1244; see also Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508
N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 1993) (citing Strock).
193. Jill Fedje, Liability for Sexual Abuse: The Anomalous Immunity of Churches, 9 LAW &
INEQ. J. 133, 154-55 (1990).
194. Id. at 587-88; see also Scott v. Central Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 129-30 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (stating that employer is not vicariously liable when employee substantially
deviates from his duties); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that for respondeat superior liability to apply, the conduct must be
characteristic of the activities of the church or reasonably foreseeable, and "[ilt would defy every
notion of logic and fairness to say that sexual activity between a priest and a parishioner is
characteristic of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church"); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,
862 P.2d 310, 330 (Colo. 1993) (stating that priest engaging in oral sex was "serious breach of
[his] ordination vows" and not within the scope of employment with church); Alpharelta First
United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 535 (Ga. 1996) (finding that the defendant
church organizations were not liable under the theory of respondeat superior, because sexual
behavior was contrary to the tenets and principles of the Methodist Church and is not a part of, or
in any way incidental to, a minister's duties and responsibilities).
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deliberate allocation of risk.'95 The private enterprise which profited while
injuring others through its employees' torts was viewed as better able to
absorb the risk and distribute it through higher prices or insurance." The
problem of who should bear the loss was at the core of the discussion, and it
was clear that the private employer was in a better position to do so. In
addition, if an employer were held liable, there would be a greater incentive to
be careful in the selection, instruction, and supervision of the employees.'97
Negligent hiring is a separate cause of action which falls outside the scope
of vicarious liability.'98 Vicarious liability is based on an agency theory,
while negligent hiring is based on the law of torts.'" Some courts have pro-
tected churches by requiring that plaintiffs state with particularity all claims
alleging negligent hiring of clergy.2" Negligent hiring claims require that the
church knew or should have known of the cleric's propensity for sexual
misconduct.'O° This can be shown when there is a history of sexual
improprieties or through psychological evaluations. Liability should be
imposed only on a clear showing of sexual dysfunction.2 2 To impose
liability on the basis of negligent hiring, the plaintiff must allege that the
actions of the cleric were foreseeable because the individual cleric was known
to be potentially dangerous.2 3 If psychological tests are conducted2"4 or the
cleric has a history of such behavior, this will be easier to establish.
195. KEETON E7 AL., supra note 156, § 69, at 500.
196. Id. at 500-01.
197. Id. at 501.
198. Moses, 863 P.2d at 324 n.16.
199. Id.
200. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ohio 1991).
201. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
202. See Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (requiring a showing that the church knew of the propensity for the type of miscon-
duct alleged by plaintiff, and rejecting negligent hiring claim where plaintiff could only show
generalized knowledge of misconduct based on cheating on exams at seminary, and psychological
testing which revealed difficulty controlling impulses, aggression, etc.).
203. A church will be exposed to liability if it fails to inform prospective employers about a
former minister's employment record, especially incidents of sexual misconduct. For instance, in
Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), the
court awarded $855,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages to a child
who alleged that a priest had sexually molested children for years. The appeals court upheld the
lower court's reduction of the punitive damage award but also held liable the Diocese of Winona,
which transferred the priest to the Archdiocese, since a clergyman in the former was aware of the
priest's sexual transgressions. Id. at 809-10. The rationale for liability in these cases is
summarized by the Ohio Supreme Court: "[E]ven the most liberal construction of the First
Amendment will not protect a religious organization's decision to hire someone who it knows is
likely to commit criminal or tortious acts .... Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991).
The Colorado Supreme Court has gone even further than the Minnesota and Ohio courts, imposing
liability for foreseeable behavior based not only on past conduct, but also on character attributes
of the employee. Liability attaches when the employer hires a person when that employer has
"reason to believe that the person, by reason of some attribute of character or prior conduct,
would create an undue risk of harm to others in carrying out his or her employment
responsibilities." Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo. 1992). See J.
Brent Walker, Sins of the Flesh: When Preachers Sexually Transgress, LIBERTY, Nov.Dec. 1993,
at 24.
204. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 327-29.
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Churches should have a duty to disclose information about prior
misconduct of clerics and any resultant treatment. This duty will break the
code of silence which presently exists. If a priest has engaged in sexual
improprieties, the church should be required to submit a confidential report to
the hiring body at any prospective church and should be held liable to the
victims if it does not disclose this information.2"5 Pressure from their
denominations will make clergy cognizant of the seriousness of their sexual
improprieties, which should have a deterrent effect. Even if appellate courts
did not uphold damage awards, the loss of faith in the churches and the lack
of stewardship of its members would have a financial impact. Moreover, even
if the courts do not impose legal liability on churches for their clerics'
misconduct, the churches have a moral duty to protect the women involved.
Negligent retention and/or supervision claims also require a showing that
the church organization knew or should have known of the priest's behavior,
so that a trier of fact can find that the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff
was foreseeable."° To avoid liability, a church must act promptly to
investigate thoroughly any claims of sexual misconduct. If there is a pattern of
claims and the cleric is retained without adequate ameliorative action, the
church should be found liable.
Both the courts and legislature have rejected attempts to protect the
church from liability through charitable immunity. 7 In addition, although
churches are not profit-making establishments, they can allocate the risk by
obtaining liability insurance. Women have not received justice in society in
general, or in the courts in particular, and these injustices are reflected and
magnified as women enter the judicial system to seek legal remedies for
sexual abuse within the church. Women who seek redress within the legal
system often face a particularly difficult evidentiary burden because problems
derived from abuse do not necessarily surface in the area of sexual
dysfunction, but in seemingly unrelated areas such as anxiety disorders,
psychiatric hospitalizations, suicide attempts, depression, dissociative disorders
and pathological guilt.2"' In addition, the client's initial goal of the therapy
205. The vicarious liability claim is frequently based on an allegation that the church
negligently hired, supervised and/or retained the priest. An employment or agency relationship is a
prerequisite to this finding. Id. at 323-24. The existence of this relationship is determined by the
conduct of the parties and is a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 323-24. Denominations which
have a hierarchical church structure will be more vulnerable. If there is monitoring of the priest's
education, screening, and psychological evaluation by the governing body, compensation
monitoring, discipline and/or guidelines for pastoral counseling, then it is more likely that there
will be a finding of vicarious liability. Id. at 327. The agency doctrine of vicarious tort liability is
limited by a requirement that the principal may only be found liable if the agent is acting within
the scope of his employment. Id. at 324 n.16; Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 286-87 (Colo.
1988).
206. See Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386-87 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (acknowledging
a claim of negligent supervision where the plaintiff alleged that church employed cleric to counsel
parishioners, but failed to investigate claims of sexual misconduct, and failed to remove or
supervise cleric or warn parishioners after cleric's nervous breakdown).
207. James T. O'Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the
Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 31, 59-60 (1994).
Only a few jurisdictions retain the doctrine of charitable immunity under very limited circumstanc-
es. Id. at 60.
208. See Victoria J. Swenson, A Proposal for Texas Re: Non-Psychiatric Physicians Who
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
was never met and these problems may resurface, in an aggravated form, as a
result of the cleric's sexual abuse. Research shows that abuse by a therapist or
counselor discourages victims from seeking help for subsequent disorders,2"
alienates parishioners from their churches, often cuts them off from their
peers,20 and results in the frequent dissolution of marriages. Hence, the
cleric has doubly sinned, by failing to act in the best interests of his
parishioners, and by depriving them of the benefits of effective counseling,
now and in the future. When courts refuse to recognize a cause of action for




In the interest of maintaining the fine line of division between church and
state, states have statutorily exempted clergy from governmental regulation or
licensing."' "Were the state to require licensing of the clergy, it would, on
the one hand, have to establish criteria of eligibility which would necessitate
the state's involvement in doctrinal and theological matters clearly forbidden
by the First Amendment, one purpose of which was to free religious
institutions from domination or interference by the state." ' Even where the
state regulates psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, or other counseling
professionals, these states exempt clergy.2 3 This has been viewed as
evidence of a public policy not to regulate any form of counseling activities
engaged in by clergy.2 4 Such an interpretation reflects an overly restrictive
view of the public policy. There is no need for the legislature to turn a blind
eye to all activities engaged in by clergy, particularly when those activities
Engage in Sexual Conduct with Their Patients, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 269, 285-86 & n.100
(1994) (reporting on a survey of patients who engaged in sexual relations with their therapists
showing that 90% of the victims were psychologically damaged, 11% serious enough to be
hospitalized as a result of the sexual exploitation, while one percent committed suicide); see also
Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 188 (discussing array of injuries to patients who engage in
sexual contact with their psychotherapists). In one reported case, a pastor slept with more than 30
women, one of whom tried to commit suicide while several got divorced. After an investigation,
"[tlhe pastor was quietly removed, the records of the inquiry were destroyed and [the accuser] ...
was branded a 'troublemaker' by the new minister. The old minister moved on to a larger,
wealthier parish." Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48.
209. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 186-87.
210. FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 110-12.
211. See Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, in
H. NEWTON MALONY ET AL., CLERGY MALPRACTICE 48, 56 (1986).
212. Id. at 48-49.
213. Id, at 49.
214. See Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice supra note 1, at 176.
Exemption provisions . . . indicate that the legislature has recognized that the subject
matter of counseling by the clergy may often be the same as that facing the licensed and
regulated profession. However, the legislature, through the exemption provisions, has
recognized that the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the competence of
counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious organizations.
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exploit women sexually. As illogical as it may appear, some legislatures have
done this.
Illinois statutes specifically exclude religious or spiritual counseling from
the reach of the statutes which purport to punish therapists engaged in
prohibited sexual contact with their clients.2 5 The case of Dausch v.
Rykse 16 addresses the issue of whether a cleric's counseling is psychother-
apy within the meaning of a state statute which prohibits sexual exploitation
by psychotherapists.2 7 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding that the plaintiff's allegations of professional negligence
against the church defendants amounted to a claim for clergy malpractice, a
cause of action not recognized under Illinois law.2 8  Regarding the
professional negligence allegation against Rykse, the district court concluded
that Mrs. Dausch "had failed to allege adequately that Rykse's psychological
counseling was not part of the church's religious beliefs and practices....
[Therefore] the First Amendment was implicated and Mrs. Dausch failed to
state a valid claim."2 9 The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and
remanded in part, upholding claims for professional negligence against the
individual defendant and violation of the sexual exploitation by psychothera-
pists statute."'
Five states--Colorado, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Wyoming-specifically criminalize sexual contact or assault occurring under
the guise of medical treatment.22" ' In general, these states made it a felony for
a physician to engage in sexual contact during medical treatment or
examination.22 One New Hampshire court applied the New Hampshire
215. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/1-1(e) (West 1993) ("Psychotherapy does not
include counseling of a spiritual or religious nature.")
216. 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
217. Ms. Dausch alleged that between January 1988 and June 1990, the pastor of Knox
Presbyterian Church held himself out, as did his church, as a "duly qualified person engaged in
providing psychological counseling to members of his congregation." Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1427-28.
Ms. Dausch, while a member of the congregation, received psychological counseling from the
defendant to assist her in coping with ongoing depression. Id. at 1428. According to the
complaint, in the course of this counseling relationship, "Rykse compelled, encouraged, fostered
and engaged in dangerous and improper counseling relations" with Dausch, which culminated in
sexual relations during the psychotherapy sessions. Id.
218. id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1429.
221. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(h), 404(1)(g) (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520b(l)(f)(iv) (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 I(g) (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-37-2(4) (1994); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-303 (a)(vii) (1988).
In People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1986), the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-403(1)(h). The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating
that the phrase "bona fide medical purposes" is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 127. The court
said that "sexual penetration or intrusion made during treatment or examination is for other than
'bona fide medical purposes' [as the phrase is used in § 18-3-403(l)(h)l, when it is not taken in
good faith, honestly, and sincerely in the course of investigating, preventing, alleviating, or curing
a disease or malady." Id. The statute was not found to be overbroad because constitutionally
protected behavior was not infringed. Id. at 128. "Defendant was convicted for committing a
sexual intrusion during the course of an examination on a patient. ... Such conduct is not
constitutionally protected and, thus, defendant's overbreadth argument fails." Id.
222. Linda Jorgenson et al., The Furor over Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New
Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 668-70 (1991).
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statute to a psychologist who was not a licensed physician since that state's
definition of "practicing medicine" included persons who "shall diagnose,
operate on, prescribe for or otherwise treat any human ailment, physical or
mental." '223 On the other hand, Michigan courts have refused to apply the
Michigan statute to psychologists.224 Wyoming, which includes as potential
defendants anyone "who by reason of his position, is able to exercise signifi-
cant influence over a person," has found that the statute applies to a girls'
volleyball coach accused of sexual assault by a student.225
Some states prosecute psychotherapists who sexually exploit their clients.
Proper wording of these statutes is essential to include all appropriate potential
defendants and all prohibited behavior. The language of the statutes, however,
varies significantly. For example "psychotherapy" is defined as "the
professional treatment, assessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional
illness, symptom or condition" in Minnesota, California, and Florida.226 Yet
Colorado more broadly defines it as "the treatment, diagnosis, or counseling in
a professional relationship to assist individuals or groups to alleviate mental
disorders, understand unconscious or conscious motivation, resolve emotional,
relationship, or attitudinal conflicts, or modify behaviors which interfere with
effective emotional, social or intellectual functioning." '227 Moreover, some
state statutes speak not to psychotherapy but to "mental health services," and
define such as "the treatment, assessment, or counseling of another person for
a cognitive, behavioral, emotional, mental or social dysfunction, including an
intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunction.
228
Six states-Wisconsin, 229 Texas,230 South Dakota,23' North
223. State v. VonKlock, 433 A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H. 1981) (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
329:1 (1955)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Smith, 503 A.2d 774 (N.H. 1985).
224. Jorgenson, et al., supra note 222, at 670 n.143.
225. See Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-
303(a)(vi) (1988).
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.93(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 491.0112(4)(a)
(West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01 (West 1989).
227. See Jorgenson, et al., supra note 222, at 673 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT § 18-3-
405.5(4)(i) (Supp. 1995); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.93(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
491.0112(4)(a) (West 1991)).
228. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15(1)(d) (West 1993).
229. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.70(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995). That statute provides:
(a) Any person who suffers, directly or indirectly, a physical, mental or emotional injury
caused by, resulting from or arising out of sexual contact with a therapist who is
rendering or has rendered to that person psychotherapy, counseling or other assessment
or treatment of or involving any mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition has
a civil cause of action against the psychotherapist for all damages resulting from, arising
out of or caused by that sexual contact. Consent is not an issue in an action under this
section, unless the sexual contact that is the subject of the action occurred more than 6
months after the psychotherapy, counseling, assessment or treatment ended.
Id.
230. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 81.003 (West Supp. 1996). The Texas statute
provides a cause of action against a mental health provider for sexual exploitation causing
damages. Id. § 81.002. However, "mental health services" provided by a cleric do not include
"religious, moral, and spiritual counseling, teaching, and instruction." Apparently the legislature is
attempting to prohibit sexual conduct during personal counseling sessions, but excludes "spiritual
counseling" to ward off First Amendment challenges. § 81.001(7) (1996).
231. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-27 to -29 (Michie Supp. 1996). The definition of
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Dakota,232  Iowa, 33  and Minnesota 234-- expressly prohibit clergy persons
from sexual exploitation of counselees. Each of these states includes clerics in
the definition of "therapist" or "psychotherapist" in the statutes that prohibit
sexual exploitation in the psychotherapist-client relationship."' In addition to
civil penalties, Minnesota, under its Criminal Code, provides that criminal
sexual conduct in the third degree includes consensual sexual relations
between a psychotherapist and patient or former patient.236 The penalty in-
cludes imprisonment for not more than fifteen years or payment of a fine of
not more than $30,000, or both.237
Psychotherapist sexual contact with a patient is a felony in nearly all the
states that have criminalized such behavior. 3s For example, the Iowa Statute
makes it a felony for a counselor or therapist to engage in sexual contact with
a patient or client (or former patient or client) and defines counselor or
therapist as a "physician, psychologist, nurse, professional counselor, social
"psychotherapist" includes a member of the clergy. Id. § 22-22-27(3). A psychotherapist who
engages in sexual contact with an emotionally dependent patient commits a Class 5 felony. Id. §
22-22-28. A psychotherapist who knowingly engages in an act of sexual penetration with an
emotionally dependent patient commits a Class 4 felony. Id. § 22-22-29.
232. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1995).
233. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15 (West 1993).
234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.02 (West 1989) (stating that a "cause of action against a
psychotherapist for sexual exploitation exists for a patient or former patient for injury caused by
sexual contact with the psychotherapist, if the sexual contact occurred"); see also State v.
Ohrtman, 466 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (construing § 609.345(l)(h) (1990), and
finding no liability under this fourth-degree criminal conduct statute when a complainant alleged
that a pastor, during a counseling session,"requested a beer, asked for and, after pulling up his
shirt, received a back rub, allegedly encouraged [complainant] to divorce her husband and ...
gave [complainant] a hug during which he compressed her breasts against his chest... [and] [h]is
penis was erect during the hug").
235. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.70(1)(e) (West Supp. 1995) ("'Therapist' means a
physician, psychologist, social worker, marriage and family therapist, professional counselor,
nurse, chemical dependency counselor, member of the clergy or other person, whether or not
licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy."); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 148A.01. Subd. 5 (West 1989) ("'Psychotherapist' means a physician, psychologist,
nurse, chemical dependency counselor, social worker, member of the clergy, marriage and family
therapist, mental health service provider, or other person, whether or not licensed by the state,
who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.")
Id.
236. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344. (West Supp. 1996). That section states, in part:
(g) ... [NJeither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the com-
plainant is a defense;
(h) the actor is a psychologist and the complainant is a patient of the psychotherapist
and the sexual penetration occurred:
(i) during the psychotherapy session; or
(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing psychotherapist-patient
relationship exists.
Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a former patient of the
psychotherapist and the former patient is emotionally dependent upon the
psychotherapist;
(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and
the sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the
complainant is not a defense;
Id. § 609.344(l)(g)-(j).
237. Id. § 609.344(2).
238. See Jorgensen et al., supra note 222 at 683.
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worker, marriage or family therapist, alcohol or drug counselor, member of the
clergy, or any other person, whether or not licensed or registered by the state,
who provides or purports to provide mental health services." '239 Mental health
service is defined as the "treatment, assessment, or counseling of another
person for cognitive, behavioral, emotional, mental, or social dysfunction,
including an intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunction." 2" In Georgia, the
call for legislation came on the heels of reports of the sexual exploitation of
parishioners by clergy.24  Washington has a law requiring a background
check on anyone working with children or vulnerable adults, regardless of
whether they are clergy.22
This approach is directed at punishing the offending behavior without
interfering with the general counseling relationship or running afoul of the
First Amendment. It is unlikely that any judge, politician or clergy would
make an argument that sexual relations with a parishioner is an integral and
protected aspect of a therapeutic relationship. In fact, Minnesota's criminal
statute may be criticized for not going far enough, by limiting the complainant
to "sexual penetration" which occurs during the "psychotherapy session" '243
when "former patient is emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist,
''44'
or the "sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception. '
Under Minnesota's statute, a civil action permits a cause of action for injury
caused by the more broadly defined "sexual contact."" This more expansive
239. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15(1)(a) (West 1993).
240. Id. § 709.15(l)(d).
241. Gayle White, Women Alleging Sex Links to Ministers Push for Law: Bill Would Make It
Illegal for Clergy to Exploit Flock, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 22, 1992, at C4.
242. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.43.830-.832 (West Supp. 1996); John Dart, Churches
Move Toward Reducing Sexual Misconduct by Clergy Abuse, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1991, at F18.
243. MINN. STAT. ANN, § 609.344(h)-(i) (West Supp. 1996).
244. Id. § 609.344(i).
245. Id. § 609.344(j). Therapeutic deception is defined as "a representation by a
psychotherapist that sexual contact with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the
patient's or former patient's treatment." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01(8) (West 1989).
246. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01(7) (West 1989). That section states:
"Sexual Contact" means any of the following, whether or not occurring with the
consent of a patient or former patient:
(1) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse or any intrusion,
however slight, into the genital or anal openings of the patient's or former patient's body
by any part of the psychotherapist's body or by any object used by the psychotherapist
for this purpose, or any intrusion, however slight, into the genital or anal openings of the
psychotherapist's body by any part of the patient's or former patient's body or by any
object used by the patient or former patient for this purpose, if agreed to by the psycho-
therapist;
(2) kissing of, or the intentional touching by the psychotherapist of the patient's
or former patient's genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast or of the clothing
covering any of these body parts;
(3) kissing of, or the intentional touching by the patient or former patient of the
psychotherapist's genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast or of the clothing
covering any of these body parts if the psychotherapist agrees to the kissing or
intentional touching.
"Sexual contact" includes requests by the psychotherapist for conduct described
in clauses (1) to (3).
"Sexual contact" does not include conduct described in clause (1) or (2) that is a
part of standard medical treatment of a patient.
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view is exactly what the courts should have done, but have neglected to do, to
date.
The involvement of the legislature in curbing abusive behavior by clergy
engaged in this type of predatory behavior is essential. The legislature is able
to fashion a narrow remedy, tailored to the evil to be remedied-the use of the
clergy's position and influence to engage in sexual relationships with
vulnerable women. Because the parameters would be prescribed in the statute,
First Amendment difficulties and extension of liability to cover the Nally type
of case could be avoided. Therefore, when the case involves the content of the
counseling and the religious beliefs imparted by the priest, rather than the
priest's conduct, the statute would not be applicable. The courts, however,
could also recognize that once a cleric has gained the trust of his parishioner
during counseling, a duty to act in the best interests of the counselee attaches.
B. Judicial Solutions
1. Clergy-Counselee as a Fiduciary Relationship
a. Towards Recognition of Fiduciary Duty Liability
Some federal courts, applying New York and Illinois law,247 as well as
some state courts, 24 have rejected both the fiduciary duty theory and the
clergy malpractice theory to allow recovery for counselees injured by the
sexual misconduct of their clergy. Other courts have denied clergy malpractice
claims, but allowed claims based on breach of fiduciary duty,249 reasoning
that a breach of fiduciary duty involves a betrayal of trust and does not require
a professional relationship or a professional standard of care-two criteria of a
clergy malpractice action cited by courts as reasons for the denial of clergy
malpractice causes of action. 50 Courts allowing fiduciary duty actions to
247. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that defining the
scope of fiduciary duty would raise the same constitutional difficulties as formulation of a
malpractice standard); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois
law).
248. See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Ark. 1996) (barring breach of
fiduciary duty claim based on heart balm statute); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239,
1243 (Ohio 1988) (questioning viability of clergy malpractice action but not finding on the facts,
and barring breach of fiduciary duty claim based on heart balm statute); Bladen v. First
Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789, 794, 796 (Okla. 1993) (finding that since the clergy do not
utilize transference as a therapeutic tool, they cannot be charged with malpractice for mishandling
the transference phenomena, and barring breach of fiduciary duty claim based on heart balm
statute); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 911-12 (Neb. 1993) (finding that
parishioner's breach of fiduciary duty claim merely alleged the elements of clergy malpractice and
was, hence, not actionable).
249. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153
(1993); Destdfano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of
Christ, 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, No. 95SC42 (June 19, 1995); Jones v.
Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (distinguishing Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp.
321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), on grounds that breach of fiduciary duty occurred outside the counseling
relationship, obviating the need to impose a uniform standard of religious counseling); Erickson v.
Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
250. Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284. The Colorado Supreme Court stated, "We have no difficulty
in finding that Grabrian, as a marriage counselor to [the plaintiffs), owed a fiduciary duty [to
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proceed find that the combination of the position of trust held by the clergy,
exacerbated by the counseling relationship, meant that the clergy, who were in
a superior position to the counselees, assumed a duty to act in good faith, and
then breached that duty.25' The courts that make this distinction are willing
to allow recovery for sexual abuse and other limited transgressions of
clergy, 52 while preserving the content of religious counseling from judicial
scrutiny."s A fiduciary relationship has been defined as one in which "trust
them]. His duty to the [counselee] was 'created by his undertaking' to counsel her." Id.; see also,
Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13 (reaffirming the result in DeStefano). Specifically, the Moses court
noted that the relevant common facts were not the profession of the defendants but, rather, the
"relevant facts are that the defendants in both cases occupied a position of superiority, assumed a
duty to act in good faith, and then breached their duty." Id.
Destefano and Moses were distinguished somewhat by DeBose, 890 P.2d at 220-21. The
Colorado Court of Appeals found that in establishing the breach of fiduciary duty, the court must
look to the motivation behind the defendant's acts. Id. If actuated by a sincerely held religious
belief, all the attendant First Amendment free exercise concerns would be implicated, even in
cases based on breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Whether a belief is "religious" is an issue of law, but
whether the defendant's conduct was motivated by this belief is a fact question for the jury. Id.
The proposed legislative solution in Part IV of this paper attempts to balance these concerns. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.
The New York courts have found a fiduciary relationship outside the counseling scenario.
Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The New York Supreme Court found a fiduciary relationship between
a clergy member and a minor parishioner with whom he played sports. Id. However, the Jones
court found the lack of a counseling relationship a crucial element, as it obviated the perceived
need to implicate the court in the religious dogma and practices of the church. Id. at 930. This
distinction rests on the most tenuous of principles, and it pays undue homage to form over sub-
stance. The same standard should apply to both scenarios, that is, the duty to act in the best inter-
ests of the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship.
251. Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13.
252. See, e.g., Adams v. Moore, 385 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). The court found a
fiduciary relationship between a preacher and a member of his congregation in a real estate matter.
Id. at 801. Allegedly to assist a financially strapped parishioner, a pastor and a friend assumed the
parishioner's mortgage of $12,000 and paid her $1,000 in exchange for the house which was
valued at $32,000. Id. at 800. The pastor sold the house for a significant profit and the plaintiff
sued, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. id. The court upheld her claim. Id. at 801.
253. Concerns are often voiced of a slippery slope progression to a Nally-type "negligent
counseling" claim. Such concerns were best expressed by Judge Brieant of the United States Dis-
trict Court sitting in the Southern District of New York. After concluding that a claim premised
upon a breach of fiduciary duty was merely a clergy malpractice action in disguise, he stated:
The difficulty is that this Court ... must consider not only this case, but the next case
to follow, and the ones after that, before we embrace the newly invented tort of clergy
malpractice, This places us clearly on the slippery slope and is an unnecessary venture
since existing laws ... provide adequate protection for society's interests. Where could
we stop? Assume a severely depressed person consults a storefront preacher, unaffiliated
with any of the mainstream denominations, but with them, equally protected by the First
Amendment. The cleric consults with our hypothetical citizen, reminds him of his
slothful life, and that he is a miserable sinner; recommends prayer and fasting and warns
of the Day of Judgment. Our depressed person becomes more so, and kills himself and a
few more people .... As to a licensed psychiatrist or social worker, our lay courts
should have no trouble adjudicating a claim of professional malpractice on these facts.
As to a clergyman, it would be both impossible and unconstitutional to attempt to do so.
Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 328. The New York Supreme Court does not share this view:
This Court... is confident the judicial process can provide a brake to the slide when
needed. In the words of Mr. Justice Harlan, "It is always possible to shrink from a first
step lest the momentum will plunge the law into pitfalls that lie in the trail ahead. I, for
one, do not believe that a "slippery slope" is necessarily without a constitutional toehold.
Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970)).
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and confidence are necessarily reposed by one party, investing in the other
party a corresponding amount of power.""5 4 Hence, an imbalance of power is
inherent in fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary law, rooted in equity, is designed
to counteract the risks associated with this imbalance of power by a variety of
protective rules and evidentiary presumptions. 5' Judge Cardozo's description
of the role of fiduciaries is instructive:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.256
The "constitutional toehold" referred to by Justice Harlan may very well be the distinction
between the sexual misconduct cases and the content-based negligent counseling claims of Nally.
Classically, the goal of fiduciary law is to minimize the inherent risk of the unequal power
relationship between the fiduciary and the "entrustor." See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs.
Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
897, 946 n.227 (1993) (citing Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconstitutional Fiduciary, 23
SETON HALL L. REv. 21, 25, 49 n.103 (1992)). One of the rules that has developed over time to
protect the interests of the entrustor is that which forbids the fiduciary from self dealing, that is,
the fiduciary cannot put his own interests above that of his charge, even if the charge also benefits
from the transaction. Id. at 909-10.
From a fiduciary law perspective, sexual misconduct between the counselor and counselee
is a per se violation of the fiduciary's duty to act in the best interests of his entrustor. This is so
because regardless of the fiduciary's belief that the act is in the "best interests" of the counselee,
there is an element of immediate sexual and ego gratification that inures to the fiduciary's benefit,
almost always at the expense of his counselee. In the Nally negligent counseling scenario,
however, this element of self gratification is conspicuously absent. Although it is conceivable that
a clergy counselor that deliberately manipulated his counselee to reach a certain result beneficial
to the counselor would also be in violation of a fiduciary duty, such a situation is not amenable to
the proposed per se rule of sexual misconduct.
254. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 196; see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983) (providing a general discussion of fiduciary law, and coining the
term "entrustor" to indicate the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship).
255. Some of the advantages that typically accrue to the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship
include: 1) the fiduciary will have the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction in dispute;
2) the fiduciary will be subject to a duty of full disclosure, reversing the presumption of caveat
emptor; 3) the duty of the beneficiary to discover fraud will be relaxed; 4) the fiduciary
relationship may operate to remove an oral or defectively executed contract from the Statute of
Frauds in favor of the beneficiary; and 5) benefits accruing to the fiduciary may be held in trust
for the beneficiary. Gregory B. Westfall, "But I Know It When I See It": A Practical Framework
for Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835, 869
n.3 (1992) (focusing on Texas law).
Of course, the overriding duty of all fiduciaries is the duty of loyalty. See generally, Austin
W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1959). Hence, even if the beneficiary gives his consent to the fiduciary, the
transaction can be voided if the consent was uninformed, or it was induced by improper conduct
of the fiduciary, or if the beneficiary was not of competent age and understanding. Scott, supra at
541-42. "[Tlhe consent of the beneficiary is indeed a slender reed upon which a trustee may lean."
Id. at 542. Even upon full disclosure and consent by the beneficiary, the transaction must be
objectively reasonable and undertaken in good faith. Id. At times, courts have made a distinction
between a "fiduciary relationship" and a merely "confidential relationship." Scallen, supra note
253, at 906-07; see also Westfall, supra, at 837-41 (describing the three types of fiduciary rela-
tionships recognized by Texas courts: the "formal" or "technical"; the informal, or "confidential
relationship"; and "special relationships"). The distinction between the two groups is reflected
more in evidentiary burdens rather than in substantive duties. See infra note 264 and accompany-
ing text.
256. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). This definition has been criticized
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Historically, fiduciary relationships include: trustee to beneficiary;
guardian to ward; agent to principal; attorney to client; executor to legatees or
beneficiaries; partner to partner; corporate directors or officers to the
corporation; majority shareholders to other shareholders; and bailor to
bailee.25 This range of relationships demonstrates that a professional
relationship does not preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship."'
When presented with a new type of relationship which does not fit within the
parameters of a traditional fiduciary relationship, courts will analogize to
determine if a fiduciary relationship exists. 9 Consequently, some courts
have found fiduciary relationships between physicians and their patients,2"
social workers and their charges26' and, of course, between minister and
parishioner.262 The pattern that emerges is one where courts will extend the
as being unduly vague and nebulous. See, e.g, Scallen, supra note 253, at 907 n.36 ("Although
certainly a classic and vivid example of Cardozo's rhetorical prowess, one cannot defend it on the
grounds of clarity.").
257. Frankel, supra note 254, at 795-96. Cases illustrating these relationships include: Tante
v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686, 689 (Ga. 1994) (attorney to client); Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v.
Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 863 P.2d 355, 362 (Kan. 1992) (trustee to beneficiary); Steelman v. Mallory,
716 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Idaho 1986) (corporate director to corporation); Greene v. First Nat'l Bank,
516 N.E.2d 311, 315 (I11. App. Ct. 1987) (executor to beneficiaries); Deason v. Gutzler, 622
N.E.2d 1276, 1281 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (principal to agent); Linge v. Ralston Purina Co., 293
N.W.2d 191, 194 (Iowa 1980) (majority shareholders to minority shareholders); and Arpadi v.
First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio 1994) (partner to partner).
However, "[tihe characterization of these relationships as 'traditional' ignores the
unequivocable fact that fiduciary law is a product of many centuries of development, some
categories may be more 'traditional' than others." Scallen, supra note 253, at 905.
258. Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2153 (1994),
259. Scallen, supra note 253, at 905; see also Frankel, supra note 254, at 804-05. The method
of analogy has been criticized, most notably by Professor Frankel, as being "uninstructive" and
"inconsistent." Id. at 805. However, the use of analogy to characterize novel fiduciary relation-
ships remains a prevalent judicial exercise. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 891 (1988). Professor Scallen states that:
The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more powerfully
than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation. Courts
considering whether to impose a fiduciary constraint in a novel context rely heavily on
comparisons to more conventional contexts in which the constraint does apply. Although
some commentators find this pattern intellectually unsatisfying, its pervasiveness and
persistence suggest that it is an inevitable aspect of fiduciary analysis.
Scallen, supra note 253, at 903 n.18. Hence, it is the proposal of this paper that the clergy-
counselee relationship requires constraints that are similarly imposed in analogous relationships, in
order to guard against the abuse of the inherent power imbalance between the clergy and their
counselees.
260. See Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986) (holding that fiduciary
obligations prohibit a neurologist from sleeping with his patient under the guise of treatment,
thereby aggravating her condition); Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 649 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd, 589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978) (requiring physician to exercise utmost good faith toward
patient); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 649 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that
fiduciary relationship exists between physician and his patient, prohibiting unauthorized release of
confidential information).
261. Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) (finding a state-licensed social
worker placed in position of trust, the breach of which would constitute a breach of the fiduciary
relationship).
262. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (holding that defendant owed
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff); see also Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13 (reasoning that "[tlhe
position of trust occupied by the defendant, when coupled with his positive act of counseling the
plaintiff, resulted in a duty to the plaintiff," and holding that the "position of trust ... a person in
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protection of fiduciary law to relationships whenever their prime characteristic
is that "the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom
trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in
a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party. 263
Some courts recognize a difference between a "fiduciary relationship" and
a merely "confidential relationship," but have generally applied the substantive
rules of fiduciary law to both."6 These courts will set aside a deal or
undertaking between the parties upon a showing that the fiduciary or more
powerful party breached his fiduciary duty.
The difference between a confidential and fiduciary relationship is greatest
in the realm of evidentiary burdens. Various evidentiary presumptions work in
favor of the entrustor in a fiduciary relationship, but not for the dependent in a
confidential relationship.265  Specifically, the entrustor is entitled to a
presumption that she relied on the fiduciary to act in her best interests,
whether or not she actually did rely.26 In addition, the entrustor alone is
entitled to cancel certain transactions between the fiduciary and the
entrustor.267 The fiduciary has the burden of proof that his actions were fair
and in the best interest of the entrustor.26 In a confidential relationship, the
dependent must prove that she in fact relied upon the power-bearer without the
a fiduciary relation [owes] to another [implies] a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to
matters within the scope of the relation").
263. Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Professor Scallen
suggests that courts have been willing to extend fiduciary obligations, though in various guises,
when there is a pattern of elements, such as:
(1) dependence or vulnerability by one party on the other, that
(2) results in power being conferred on the other,
(3) such that the entrusting party is not able to protect itself effectively .... and
(4) thig entrustment has been solicited or accepted by the party on which the fiduciary
obligation is imposed.
Scallen, supra note 253, at 922. While all fiduciary relationships involve the first two elements of
dependence, resulting in a conferral of power, these elements by themselves would typify most
contract claims. The practical inability of the entrusting party to protect itself typifies a fiduciary
relationship, entitling the relationship to the benefits of the fiduciary legal framework. Id. at 925.
Clergy counselees fall well within this paradigm.
264. See AUSTIN WAKERMAN Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5, at 39-40 (3d ed. 1967).
Scott writes:
A fiduciary relation is to be distinguished from a merely confidential relation. A
confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of
the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind. A confidential
relation may exist although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to exist
where there is a family relationship or such a relation of confidence as that which arises
between physician and patient or priest and penitent. If one person is in a confidential,
but not a fiduciary, relation to another, a transaction between them will not be set aside
at the instance of one of them unless in fact he reposed confidence in the other, and the
other, by fraud or undue influence or otherwise, abused the confidence placed in him. A
fiduciary relation involves certain consequences to transactions between the parties that
follow automatically as a matter of law from the relation.
Id. Among the fiduciary relationships which typically serve as the foundation for the establishment
of a duty are those of guardian and ward, doctor and patient, attorney and client, and priest and
communicant. 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary § 383, at 386-89 (1961).
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benefit of any presumption, and she will also have the burden of establishing
breach.2"
Fiduciary relationships are inherently risky.270 The fiduciary is supposed
to be acting in the best interest of the entrustor, not in a manner that benefits
himself at the expense of the entrustor.27" ' So great is the need felt to
minimize the inherent risk of fiduciary relationships, many courts find that the
fiduciary is accountable for any benefit he receives, even if it is consistent
with the best interests of the entrustor.
272
In light of (1) the nature of the clergy-counselee relationship, (2) the
power imbalance between the clergy counselor and his victim, 273 and (3) the
paucity of alternatives for the victim, 27 4 the clergy-counselee relationship
should be deemed a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law.
269. Id.
270. See Frankel, supra note 254, at 808-12. Two elements exist in all fiduciary relationships
that "give rise to a risk that the fiduciary will misuse the power entrusted to him to the detriment
of the entrustor." Id. at 808. In fact, it is the inadequacy of protective mechanisms outside fidu-
ciary law to eliminate this risk that should guide courts in the imposition of fiducial restraint. Id.
These two elements are the "substitution role of the fiduciary," and the "delegation of power to
the fiduciary." Id. at 808-09. Hence, the fiduciary may act as a substitute for the entrustor in the
sense that the fiduciary has greater expertise in a certain area that makes his judgment valuable.
Secondly, the power is delegated to the fiduciary "not for his own use, but solely for the purpose
of facilitating the performance of his functions." Id. at 809. The risk of fiduciary relationships is
thus summarized:
[W]hile the fiduciary must be entrusted with power in order to perform his function, his
possession of the power creates a risk that he will misuse it and injure the entrustor....
Yet if the entrustor lessens his exposure to loss by reducing the delegated power, he
may also reduce the benefit expected from the relation.
Id.
271. Id. at 811.
272. Guth states the classic rule of fiducial accountability:
If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his duty as such, acquires gain
or advantage for himself, the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the
benefit of the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer all benefit and
profit. The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confi-
dence, but upon a broader foundation of wise public policy that, for the purpose of
removing all temptation extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of
confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation. Given the relation between the parties, a
certain result follows; and a constructive trust is the remedial device through which
precedence of self is compelled to give way to the stem demands of loyalty.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (citations omitted); accord, Borden v. Sinskey,
530 F.2d 478, 498 (3rd Cir. 1976); Savage v. Mayer, 203 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1949); Billman v. Mar-
yland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 585 A.2d 238, 246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
909 (1991); Leppaluoto v. Eggleston, 357 P.2d 725, 731 (Wash. 1960).
273. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 189-94. Jorgenson and Randles suggest that the
following five factors contribute to the imbalance of power between counselors and counselees:
(i) the client's initial vulnerability;
(2) the therapist's control of the environment;
(3) the threat of breach of confidentiality;
(4) client intimacy; and
(5) unilateral self-revelation.
Id. at 194. These factors should be strongly considered by courts in fashioning the appropriate
scope of fiduciary duty to apply; the larger the power imbalance, the more protections should be
granted to protect congregant/patients from the misuse of that power.
274. See Frankel, supra note 254, at 808-12.
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i. The Nature of the Relationship
Courts have generally found that secular counselors who engage in sexual
relationships with their clients incur liability under either a professional
malpractice or a fiduciary duty theory.275  Psychotherapists' sexual
involvement with their patients is a growing problem.276 The clergy
relationship shares the same attributes that imbue the secular relationship with
such high risk. People seeking help, whether of a spiritual or secular nature,
are likely to be vulnerable and dependent.277 They perceive some area of
their lives as deficient and the counselor as having the ability to make it
whole.27 For any counseling relationship to work, the counselee has to place
her absolute trust in the counselor, and believe that the counselor will be
acting in her best interest.
279
275. See, e.g., Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("Where a
therapist mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with his patient, courts common-
ly hold such action to constitute malpractice."); accord Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1365 (9th Cir. 1986); Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469, 476 (Cal. 1985); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153,
156-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (unregistered psychologist); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me.
1986) (social worker); Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Zipkin
v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761-62 (Mo. 1968); MacClements v. LaFone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 880
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
276. See Swenson, supra note 208, at 269 n.40 (reporting sexual misconduct as the most
frequent cause of malpractice suits against psychologists insured under the American Psychologi-
cal Association's policy in a ten year period from 1976 to 1986). The prevalence of sexual mis-
conduct claims against therapists has greatly increased the cost of malpractice insurance, and al-
most all agencies refuse to cover for negligence grounded in mishandling of the transference phe-
nomena by engaging in sexual contact with a patient. Linda Jorgenson, et al., Therapist-Patient
Sexual Exploitation and Insurance Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 595, 599-608 (1992). It has been
noted, however, that the actual rates of sexual misconduct by professionals may be declining. Carl
Sherman, Behind Closed Doors: Therapist-Client Sex, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May/June 1993, at
64-65. Rather, what may be on the increase is an awareness among the authorities of the reality of
such abuse. So stated Glen 0. Gabbard, M.D., Director of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kan-
sas:
The abuse went on for years, but it didn't come out into the open until the last decade
or so. It used to be, when a patient said her therapist had sex with her, we assumed it
was a fantasy. The rise of feminism made us all more aware of what is really going on.
Id. at 65.
277. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 190 n.52 (describing that vulnerability is, in fact,
a necessary pre-requisite to effective treatment in many schools of psychoanalytic thought). As it
pertains to therapists in general:
Clients come to therapy with personal crises and problems that they have been unable to
resolve themselves. Many times patients lack self-esteem or are fearful and doubting of
their own sanity. Patients often feel they must rely upon a professional to help them
resolve their conflicts. Clients come to therapy in search of approval and concrete an-
swers to their problems. Struggling with their private crises, many clients are in a help-
less, almost childlike position in relation to the therapist. The therapist often becomes a




279. Instructive on the necessity of trust in the therapist-counselee relationship is Melvin S.
Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 401 (1957).
Heller states:
The kind of self-awareness necessary for a cure is come by painfully and reluctantly.
The patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal material of
the most intimate and disturbing nature .... He is expected to bring up all manner of
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The overlay of religious doctrine further complicates the relationship. The
counselee sees the minister as spiritually superior-more enlightened and
closer to understanding the will of God.2 " The structural organization of the
church, or even the tenets of the religion itself, may foster this perception. For
example, parishioners call a priest in the Episcopal and Roman Catholic
denominations "father," evoking both the patriarchal structure of the church
hierarchy, as well as his religious significance as a guide, authority figure, and
a source of parental love and approval.
The transference phenomenon is also at work in this relationship,28" ' as
socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature wishes, perverse sexual thoughts-in
short, the unspeakable, the unthinkable, the repressed. To speak of such things to anoth-
er human requires an atmosphere of unusual trust, confidence and tolerance .... Patients
will be helped only if they can form a trusting relationship with the psychiatrist. Psy-
chology becomes otherwise an ineffective and intellectual exercise.
Id. at 405-06.
280. "What makes clerical seduction different from those of secular counselors is the God
factor: unlike other therapists, the minister's power and authority are perceived as ultimately de-
rived from the Lord." Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48. It has also been observed that "'the
more the minister sees his own person as central to delivering the message of God, the more he is
likely to become sexually involved with members of his congregation."' Id. at 49 (quoting psychi-
atrist Glenn Gabbard, director of the Menninger Hospital in Topeka, Kansas). Hence, it is suggest-
ed that in denominations having a "strong Pentecostal or revivalist tradition," religious rituals and
ceremonies are "linked to sexual passion." Id. "'[W]omen may well imagine that a sexual union
with this figure is going to have a tremendous benefit."' Id. (quoting Dr. Gabbard). When patho-
logical narcissism is alloyed with a claim of a divine mandate, the results have often been tragic.
Most notably in recent history was the death in a fiery inferno of more than 80 followers of David
Koresh. Tim Reiterman, Parallel Roads Led to Jonestown, Waco; Cults: Similar Forces Shaped
Jim Jones and David Koresh into the Violent, Power-Mad "Messiahs" Who Doomed Their Fol-
lowers to Death, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A24. Koresh was the leader of a splinter group of
the Seventh-day Adventists called the Branch Davidians. Born in a small town in Texas, Koresh
ultimately became "The Lamb of God" and a doomsday prophet. Id. "In [his] endless harangues,
[Koreshl bent the Bible to shake the traditional beliefs of [his] followers-and to suit [his] own
needs. Growing increasingly grandiose, [he] professed to be a pipeline to God, then God himself."
Id. After a seven week siege by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, who had been
investigating Koresh on allegations of weapons violations and child molestation, the Branch Davi-
dian compound was set ablaze. Id. It is still unclear whether the incident was a mass suicide or a
mass murder. Id.
Other self proclaimed messiahs have included the Reverend Jim Jones, who told his follow-
ers, "'Everyone has to die.... If you love me as much as I love you, we must all die or be de-
stroyed from the outside."' Tom Mathews, The Cult of Death, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1978, at 38.
After a hellish morning of confusion and despair, more than 900 of Jones's followers were dead
after drinking a poison concoction of cyanide, tranquilizers, and strawberry-flavored Kool-aid. Id.
at 39. Some took the potion voluntarily, believing in the prospect of reunion with Jones in the
afterlife, others were forced to drink at the muzzle of a gun. Id. at 40. "One old man resisted
violently; he was thrown to the ground, his jaws were pulled open and a cupful of poison was
poured down his throat." Id. Babies were murdered by spraying the cyanide down their throats
with a hypodermic syringe. Id. at 39. See also Richard Lacayo, In the Reign of Fire, TIME, Oct.
17, 1994, at 59 (describing apparent murder suicides of over 50 people in two countries at the
direction of Luc Jouret, the self-proclaimed messiah of the 'Solar Temple' sect). Glen Gabbard
explains:
I've noticed again and again that ministers go into the profession with a longing to be
loved, to be idealized, to be godlike.... When middle age sets in .... a minister fre-
quently is disappointed with the congregation's response to him. He wants to be ide-
alized but his congregation dwells on his human frailties. Then a young woman comes
to him for pastoral counseling. He is attracted to her and . . . "the client gratifies the
minister's original wish to be loved like God is."
Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48 (quoting in part, and citing, Dr. Glenn Gabbard, psychia-
trist and director of the Menninger Hospital in Topeka, Kansas).
281. A parishioner involved in pastoral counseling may develop a "deep emotional depen-
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in all counseling relationships.282 Transference involves a process where the
counselee identifies the counselor with a character from her past, typically a
father figure.283 The counselee is able to resolve past conflicts by confronting
the counselor.8 4 A competent counselor will handle this transference
appropriately and allow the counselee to resolve the conflict."5 However,
when the counselor engages in a sexual relationship with the counselee in the
course of the transference phenomenon, he has switched roles and creates
psychological confusion in the counselee.2"6 The counselee cannot resolve
the past issues, and faces new obstructions to recovery, one of which is that
she has to "keep the secret." '287 The counselor, on the other hand, is no Ion-
dence on a priest." Moses, 863 P.2d at 328 (Colo. 1993). The emotional dependence is a signifi-
cant concept in therapy known as "transference." It is the term used by therapists to describe a
counselee's emotional reaction to the therapist, and is "'generally applied to the projection of
feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some person from the
patient's past."' Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting STED-
MAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' ed. 1982)). Hence, therapists often become the
personification of repressed hopes, fears and frustrations. Joseph C. George, Psychotherapist-Pa-
tient Sex: A Proposal for a Mandatory Reporting Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 431, 437 (1985). As a result,
a patient may react sexually or affectionately to the persona represented by the priest, rather than
being actuated by a desire for the priest himself. "Transference is crucial to the therapeutic process
because . . . '[i]t is through the creation, experiencing and resolution of these feelings that [the pa-
tient] becomes well."' Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365 (quoting DONALD J. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRA-
CTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973)). Similarly, the priest may experience a phenomenon of "coun-
ter-transference," whereby the counselee/parishioner represents to him an idealization of his
dreams, hopes, and fears. George, supra at 437. The dictionary of the American Psychoanalytic
Association defines countertransference as "[a] situation in which an analyst's feelings and atti-
tudes toward a patient are derived from earlier situations in the analyst's life that have been dis-
placed onto the patient." BURNESS E. MOORE AND BERNARD A. FINE, eds., PSYCHOANALYTIC
TERMS AND CONCEPTS 47 (Yale 1990). Hence, an underlying sense of inadequacy or unfulfilled
narcissism may cause the priest to engage in sexual behavior in an effort to unite with his "ideal-
ization" of what the counselee represents. Clearly, the duty is on the priest/counselor to recognize
the transference phenomena, which occurs in every therapeutic relationship, even if not affirma-
tively used as a psychoanalytic tool, and deal with it effectively. Forewarned is forearmed.
282. See Hans H. Strupp, A Reformulation of the Dynamics of the Therapist's Contribution, in
EFFECTIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY: A HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH (Alan S. Gurman & Andrew M. Razin
eds., 1977) (stating that transference is associated with, but not limited to, the psychotherapeutic
relationship). Management theorists suggest that transference occurs in any leader-follower rela-
tionship, rendering followers vulnerable to the way a leader communicates and proposes action.
Daniel Sankowsky, The Charismatic Leader as Narcissist: Understanding the Abuse of Power,
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Spring 1995, at 57, 59.
283. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' ed. 1982).
284. See DONALD J. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973).
285. Courts have held that mishandling of the transference phenomenon is malpractice or
gross negligence. See Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1985); Moses, 863 P.2d at 328 n.22;
Seymour v. Lofgreen, 495 P.2d 969 (Kan. 1972); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp.
1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 19-
84).
[A] sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be viewed separately from
the therapeutic relationship that has developed between them. The transference phenome-
non makes it impossible that the patient will have the same emotional response to sexual
contact with the therapist that he or she would have with other persons.
L.L., 362 N.W.2d at 178.
286. George, supra note 281, at 437.
287. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 316. The parishioner's sister was also asked to keep the secret
after she confronted the offending priest, Father Robinson. Id. He claimed that by admitting the
sexual relationship with Moses, he had made a "confession" which she could not divulge. Id. The
priest's superior also ascribed to this warped view:
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ger a facilitator and trusted fiduciary acting in the counselee's self interest;
rather, he is an impediment to effective healing by acting in his own self
interest.
ii. The Power Imbalance
There are six identifiable factors involved in the counseling relationship
between the cleric and parishioner that aggravate the imbalance of power
between the parties: the counselee's initial vulnerability; the counselor's
control of the environment; the confidentiality of the relationship; the leverage
gained from unilateral self-revelation; the spiritual superiority or worthiness
associated with the clergy; and finally, the counselee's desire to achieve
salvation.288 The counselee typically pursues secular or religious
counseling for marital difficulties, depression and suicidal tendencies, faith
crises or uncertainty or coping skills in many facets of her life.289 The social
stigma of seeking outside help may aggravate the counselee's vulnerable
state."' Many people envision the counseling request as a sign of weakness
and lack of self-sufficiency.29 Hence, counselees may enter the counseling
relationship full of self-doubt in their capabilities to handle the problems
facing them.
The counselor generally plays the dominant role in determining the
sequence and location of therapy. The counselee looks to the counselor to
determine how long and how often the sessions should be. The meetings often
take place in the minister's office, away from the comforts and securities of
the parishioner's home. The counselor sets the rules and leads the discussions
in an attempt to get at the root of the problem. Hence, the minister's control
of the counseling environment, literally as well as figuratively, serves to
increase the imbalance of power.
The counselor also gains power by informing the counselee that the
relationship is confidential and the counselee can put absolute trust in him. By
being the repository of confidential information, including the darkest fears
and desires of the counselee, the counselor remains in a dominant role.
292
Father Myers was angered that Mohr [the sister] did not keep Father Robinson's secret
and scolded her for discussing the relationship.... Father Myers said Father Robinson
was bishop material and that Mohr and her husband should not ruin his career. Father
Myers also... said that Father Robinson's actions were not that bad and that Tenantry
[the victim, Moses] had not been injured.
Id. The burden of keeping the secret led to the fragile plaintiff's mental and physical deterioration,
as well as the demise of her marriage and business. At the time of trial, she was under indefinite
psychiatric care. Id. at 314.
288. Four of these elements have been generally adapted from Jorgenson & Randles, supra
note 65, at 190-94. The last two factors are peculiar to religious counselors. There have been
occasions, however, where the therapist's control has been so complete that the patient sees him
as a "God-like" figure. See, e.g., Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
affd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) (recounting that the patient
testified that the therapist had become a "God," and that she dared not act contrary to his wishes
lest she displease him).
289. See Fain, supra note 10, at 103.
290. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 190-92.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 193; see also GERALD COREY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COUNSELING AND PSY-
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The counselee is there not to convince the counselor that she is a nice
person, 3 but to unburden herself from the weight of the most troublesome
aspects of her life. Revelations of sexual indiscretions, fears of homosexuality,
criminal behavior and every type of secular or spiritual confession are risky
for the counselee, but may be encouraged by the counselor as necessary for
her treatment. She must trust the minister completely not to divulge this
information to anybody else.294 This aggravates the power imbalance.295
The fact that only one party, the counselee, is disclosing information, also
contributes to the power imbalance.296 More specifically, the minister may sit
in silence during these revelations and the success of the therapy does not
require him to reveal any of his own deepest, darkest fears. Because he is in
control of his own disclosures and may legitimately refuse to answer personal
questions posed by the counselee, the transference phenomenon is facilitated.
The counselee can transform him into anyone from her past that she wishes.
Interestingly, many documented cases of sexual abuse by psychotherapists
show a pattern of the therapist selectively disclosing personal aspects of his
life in order to make the victim believe "she was special.""29 The victim is
then lulled into a false sense of security and familiarity with the counselor and
becomes an easy prey.
The final two elements are interrelated. Clergy are often considered
authorities on spiritual matters and act, in many denominations, as
intermediaries between the parishioner and God. Regardless of whether the
religion holds that a parishioner cannot hope for salvation without confession
to a priest, the cleric stands in a superior position to a parishioner. The cleric
is respected and revered. Often, clergy are entrusted to tell their parishioners
the "correct" path to salvation in compliance with the tenets of the religion.
The risk of abuse in this area is extreme and the consequences are devastating.
When a parishioner fears for the salvation of her soul, she is willing to
acquiesce to treatment that she would otherwise reject.29 This salvation
CHOTHERAPY 31-32 (1986).
293. See Heller, supra note 279, at 405.
294. Id. at 405-06; see also Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 193.
295. Id.
296. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 193 n.69 ("Classical analysts assume anonymity
toward clients, sometimes called blank-screen approach; they engage in very little self-disclosure
to foster transference.").
297. Swenson, supra note 208, at 283. Factors identified by researchers Gutheil and Gabbard
as warning signs of the violation of the boundaries of the counseling relationship are:
(1) Changing from a last name to a first name basis, thus developing a false sense of
intimacy;
(2) Discussing personal matters, particularly those of the therapist's;
(3) Moving from handshakes to pats and hugs;
(4) Meeting outside the office or for a lunchtime session;
(5) Meeting for social events;
(6) Giving gifts, waiving debts, offering a ride home.
Id. Gutheil also noted that such behavior is often preceded by comments such as, "'I ordinarily
don't do this ... "' or, "'While I don't usually do this with my patient . I..' Id. (quoting Thomas
G. Gutheil, Borderline Personality Disorder, Boundary Violations, and Patient-Therapist Sex:
Medicolegal Pifalls, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 599 (1989).
298. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 318 (stating that the victim was so concerned about her salvation
that she requested and received absolution from the Bishop who had previously refused to disci-
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"trump card" is unparalleled in the realm of secular counseling. Religious
counselors are not compelled to find a logical or rational explanation for the
path they suggest as correct, for faith is not built on foundations as fragile as
logic or social conventions. Additionally, a major Christian tenet is to
unquestioningly accept the burdens placed upon us, because who are we to
question the will of God?
iii. Alternatives for Victims
Judges often look with incredulity at the professed naivet6 of the female
victims of sexual abuse. Ignoring the classic pattern that exists in incest
victims, battered women, and victims of abuse generally, the male judge will
often apply the more rational explanation from the male perspective-that the
female consented to the sexual relationship, and now in the cold, harsh, reality
of day, she is belatedly sorry.'" Consequently, female victims of sexual
abuse by the clergy or others lack appropriate remedies in the courts. The
damage from such abuse is long-lasting, often surfacing years after the abuse,
which adds to the woman's lack of credibility.3m
Churches should have a duty to investigate thoroughly any reports of
sexual impropriety on the part of clergy. If, however, the plaintiffs could show
that the church ignored prior complaints, failed to conduct an investigation or
undertake internal measures to determine the veracity of the complaints, actual
notice could be demonstrated. Once the organization is put on notice, there is
a duty to monitor carefully the clergy's conduct, provide assistance for the
clergy, and take appropriate disciplinary measures against repeat offenders.30'
pline her clergy/therapist abuser).
299. This can lead to overly simplistic analysis. See Roppollo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La.
Ct. App. 1994). Judge Byrnes wrote of an Episcopalian priest who slept with his counselee:
Plaintiff complains about the adulterous sexual relationship between the decedent and
Dr. Moore.... But they were both adults. As there is no civil nor criminal prohibition
against such conduct between adult laypersons the State cannot penalize such conduct
because Dr. Moore was an Episcopal priest.
Id. at 208. By ignoring the true cause of injury that is conferred solely by the relation of the par-
ties, that is, a breach of trust, and equating that to a nonfiduciary relationship, Judge Byrnes decid-
ed the case on grounds of form rather than substance. The decision in Roy v. Hartogs provides a
more enlightened approach, recognizing a counselee's inability to effectively consent to abuse at
the hands of her counselor.
The ward cannot waive performance of this duty or surrender these rights of protec-
tion.... [The guardian] should not be heard to say in a court of justice, by way of legal
excuse or justification for the seduction, that the ward was capable of consenting. Con-
sent obtained under such circumstances is no consent and should stand for naught.
Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. 1975). By placing the focus on the relationship
between the parties rather than on the formalistic aspects of the sex act, the law attempts to pro-
vide an avenue to check the inherent risk of a fiduciary relationship. Such a treatment is not based
on the patronizing view of the hysterical woman unable to determine her own sexual destiny;
rather, it recognizes that the counselor-counselee relationship is analogous to other fiduciary rela-
tionships, and one cannot remove the sex act from the environment in which it occurs. Denise
LeBouef, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARV. WOM. L.J. 83, 102
(1988).
300. See Teresa K. Douglass, Comment, Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct: A Proposal for
Legislative Change in Missouri, 62 UMKC L. REV. 777, 805 n.195 (1994).
301. Moses, 863 P.2d at 328.
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A plaintiff would then escape summary judgment in a negligent hiring or
retention case only if she could plead with particularity facts which indicate
that the clergy had a past history that the employer knew or could have
reasonably discovered. 2 Liability would attach only if the plaintiff could
demonstrate that the cleric had sexual contact with her while engaged in a
counseling relationship. Sexual contact during the course of counseling would
be prima facie evidence of malpractice. This proposed scheme protects all the
parties, and the church would not be liable unless the cleric's propensity for
prohibited sexual contact were or should have been known. The plaintiff
would find refuge, under limited circumstances, in the court. To allow
churches and clergy to escape liability on the basis of the First Amendment
"would go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such bodies with an
exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the
principles constitutionally safeguarded.""3 3 Unfortunately, a clergyman falsely
accused on more than one occasion would then be subject to liability.
Although the specter of false accusations is very real, and institutions may
overreact to any accusation, the legal system is capable of determining the
veracity of witnesses, and the clergy would already have the advantage of
credibility in this area.
b. Professional Malpractice Standard
The standard for professional malpractice in jury instructions is that the
professional "must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily
possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing."3"
This refers to the skill of the practitioner in good professional standing-one
who meets the minimum negligence standard.0 5 Some commentators and
courts claim that this poses a dilemma when clergy are involved.3" For
302. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ohio 1991).
303. Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
304. KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 32, at 187. Malpractice is also defined more expan-
sively as "[pjrofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill.... It is any professional mis-
conduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice or
illegal or immoral conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
305. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 30 at 164-65. The elements of a cause of action
in negligence are:
(1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.
(2) A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: breach of
duty.
(3) A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting inju-
ry [legal or proximate cause].
(4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
Id.
306. Id.; see also Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice, supra note 1. Ericsson, who was defense
counsel in Nally v. Grace Community Church, asserts that courts are equipped to handle empirical
issues, but "[tihe issues raised in clergy counseling cases are not empirical, but religious.... They
are not conducive to judicial review because they lack objective standards." Id. at 169. Other
problems delineated by this author include the identification of the scope and nature of church-re-
lated counseling. Id. Does it include short emergency calls as well as confessions, or extended
office or home visits over long periods of time? Id. at 170. Does the duty owed to the counselee
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clergy malpractice to occur, there must be "professional misconduct," or some
deviation from a standard of care on the part of the cleric.3" Yet
determination of the appropriate standard of care for clergy is fraught with
difficulty. If the courts must determine which activities are secular and which
are spiritual, the mere analysis of activities, it is argued, will intrude upon the
First Amendment.3 8 However, it is arguable that the secularization of the
counseling function separates this activity from the ecclesiastical functions
performed by the clergy, and that imposition of a duty of care and competence
in this area would not violate First Amendment principles.3"
Another difficulty faced by the courts is that there is no prescribed
educational standard for clergy. Religion is the ultimate equal opportunity
employer. Individuals with less than a high school education and those with
postdoctoral work may achieve the same degree of success in terms of size of
congregations and incomes."' Because there is no objective standard that can
be applied to the conduct of clergy from the wide range of denominations,
some argue that courts would become involved in making judgments regarding
the competence and training of clergy and the methods and content of their
counseling in order to determine whether the cleric breached the duty imposed
by the standards of that denomination."' This argument is specious.
Certainly the tenets of organized religions and cultural norms do not approve
of sexual activity as a counseling method." 2 A secular professional is subject
vary according to the "ecclesiastical office and authority flowing from such office"? Id. Should the
training and competence inquiry of the court be limited to secular training because of the dif-
ficulty of evaluating the "spiritual gifts" of the counselor? Id. at 171. Finally, in addition to consti-
tutional problems, evaluating the content of the counseling to church members is fraught with
difficulties. Id. at 172. These objections are smokescreens. Courts are well equipped to determine,
on a case by case basis, whether a counseling relationship exists. If a clergyman hears a parishio-
ner's confession only, this would not qualify as counseling, because this is part of a liturgical
function. Home visits could qualify if they were part of an ongoing attempt to provide assistance
with a psychological problem. Bible study in the home would not be considered counseling. If the
court is determining liability for sexual misconduct, then the ecclesiastical office of the clergy, the
competence and training of the pastors, and the content of the counseling should all be secondary
considerations. The cleric's conduct should be the primary consideration.
307. "Standard of care" refers to the conduct required of an individual in a given situation.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 164. In negligent tort actions, that standard is often de-
scribed as that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise "under the same
or similar circumstances." Id. at 175. In the professional context, the standard of care refers to the
standard established by the professionals, and in the medical profession it has either varied by
locality or been applied according to a national standard. Id. at 185-88.
308. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 290 (Colo. 1988) (Quinn, J., concurring).
309. Bergman, supra note 211, at 45.
310. Accord Kelly Beers Rouse, Note, Clergy Malpractice Claims, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 383,
385 (1989).
311. Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice, supra note 1, at 171.
312. In a national random-sample survey of 1,423 practicing psychiatrists, the majority (97.-
4%) believed that sexual contact between patient and therapist is usually or always harmful to the
patient. Judith Lewis Herman et al., Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National
Survey, II: Psychiatrists' Attitudes, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 165 (1987). Ninety percent of patients
who had engaged in sexual relationships are psychologically damaged-many severely. Carl Sher-
man, Behind Closed Doors: Therapist-Client Sex, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1993, at 66. Eleven
percent of sexually exploited victims were hospitalized; one percent committed suicide as a result
of their involvement. Id. A Wisconsin survey showed, without exception, that every professional
group polled believed sexual contact between therapists and client/patient is highly likely to have
an injurious effect on the latter. Anthony Kuchan, Survey of Incidence of Psychotherapists' Sexual
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to a duty imposed based upon the state of the art within the professional
standards prescribed by his or her profession. Clergy engaged in counseling
should be subject to some minimal standard of competence-based on the
state of the art in counseling-as a psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker
should be.3 The clergy, however, would not be held to the level of compe-
tence of the specialist."4
In the case of clergy engaged in counseling, the cleric should be held
liable if his conduct did not conform to what a reasonable, prudent, competent
counselor would have done under similar circumstances.3 ' This should not
be difficult to establish when the cleric has engaged in sexual misconduct
during the counseling relationship. This view of malpractice as the deviation
from predetermined professional standards is used successfully in defending
suits in clergy malpractice.3 6 The defendants' rationale is that since clergy
cannot and should not be regulated by society, determining the appropriate
"standards" for clergy violates the separation of church and state. 3 ' This
may be true for content-based analysis of the cleric's actions (that is,
examining a cleric's statements does implicate the First Amendment), but
analyzing what he does (that is, conduct-based analysis) may avoid these
thorny constitutional issues.'
Contact with Clients in Wisconsin, in PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH CLIENTS:
INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION 51, 63 (Gary S. Schoener, et al. eds., 1989). Therapist-patient
sex may produce disorders including depression, sleep adjustment, and sexual dysfunction. KEN-
NETH S. POPE & JACQUELINE C. BOUHoUTSoS, SEXUAL INTIMACY BETWEEN THERAPISTS AND PA-
TIENTS 63-66 (1986); see also Jorgenson et al., supra note 222, at 662-63 & n.90 (discussing
damage caused by sexual exploitation to a patient by a therapist).
313. Bergman compares the clergy engaged in counseling to the mohel:
The practice of ritual circumcision originated in antiquity and its rules were developed
before the discovery of microscopic organisms and their relation to infection. If a mohel
today were to perform a circumcision in the same manner as it was performed two thou-
sand years ago, without sterilizing his instruments, and if infection were to result, would
we not be justified in considering him to have breached a duty of care?
Bergman, supra note 211, at 57-58.
314. Id. at 60-61.
315. Among the standards suggested and discarded are the "secular standard," the "state of
the art standard," and the "denominationally specific standard." Fain, supra note 10, at 101-03;
Lawrence M. Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPP.
L. REV. 137, 152-54 (1986).
The secular standard would require that clergy conform to the standard held by mental
health professionals, and is viewed as a temporal, non-religious standard. Fain, supra note 10, at
101. It has been criticized as inappropriate largely because of the differences in training and tech-
niques employed by secular mental health professionals and religious counselors. Id. at 102.
The state of the art standard poses similar problems, since it would require clergy to be-
come conversant with the latest psychological theories and therapeutic methods and to employ
them. Id. at 102-03. This has been identified as an unrealistic requirement, given that these psy-
chological techniques may be contrary to the clergy's religious beliefs. Id. at 103. The denomina-
tionally specific standard, while comparing clergy to other clergy rather than mental health pro-
fessionals, requires entanglement by the court, which may be most offensive to the First Amend-
ment. Id.
316. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 8 (indicating that if the matters of creed, teaching and
ecclesiastical discipline are implicated in a lawsuit, the First Amendment provides an "immuniz-
ing" defense).
317. Esbeck has suggested that the barriers imposed by the Free Exercise Clause and the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment are insurmountable. Id. at 8-9.
318. Asking the court to distinguish between religious and secular content in counseling may
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The mere settlement of a dispute involving a cleric by a civil court does
not imply that the civil court has inhibited the free exercise of religion.
Society should provide some redress for the victim when a counselor betrays
her trust and causes her psychological harm. The content of the counseling
relationship is clearly privileged," 9 but this shield of privilege is intended to
protect the parishioner, and the courts should not let the clergy use it to
protect themselves from exposure for their misdeeds.
3. The First Amendment Barrier Removed
a. Counseling-Religious or Secular Activity?
One commentator has suggested that the counseling conducted by clergy
is not equivalent to secular counseling, because it is a religious activity that
"involves the application of religious insight to day-to-day problems, such as
difficulties in marriage, parenthood, employment or other relationships, to
produce new religious understanding and, thereby, change in the counselee.
'The counselor and the troubled person ... enter into an emotional
relationship, in which God is the third party.' 32' This religious component,
it is argued, precludes the use of scientifically or medically based forms of
counseling in developing a standard of care.32' In addition, the diversity of
religious belief systems prevents the definition of a general standard by which
conduct may be measured. One potential solution is the application of a
require the court to interfere in issues which are inextricably intertwined. This, in itself, may be a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Mark Taylor, Nally v. Grace Community Church: The Fu-
ture of Clergy Malpractice Under Content-Based Analysis, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 661, 678-79 (19-
90).
319. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 4505 (McKinney 1992); see also People v. Carmona, 627
N.E.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. 1993) (recently interpreting § 4505).
320. Funston, supra note 1, at 515 (citing F. Braceland & D. Farnsworth, Psychiatry and
Religion, in PSYCHIATRY, THE CLERGY AND PASTORAL COUNSELING 1, 5-6 (D. Farnsworth & F.
Braceland eds., 1969)). There is an inherent tension between religious or pastoral counseling and
secular psychological treatment. David Delapane, Stand by Me: The Role of the Clergy and Con-
gregation in Assisting the Family Once It Is Involved in the Legal and Treatment Process, in
ABUSE AND RELIGION: WHEN PRAYING ISN'T ENOUGH, 173, 178 (Anne L. Horton & Judith A.
Williamson eds., 1988). Religious counselors often fear that secular therapists will discount the
faith and religious beliefs of the counselee, while secular therapists seek to find an underlying
pathology, the discovery of which may necessitate coming to grips with realizations or desires that
run contrary to the tenets of the church. Id.
Although Funston argues that the religious nature of counseling is not severable from its
secular components, this concern only seems pertinent when addressing the "negligent counseling"
type claim of Nally. Funston, supra note 1, at 516. Sexual misconduct by the clergy, however,
seems to be clearly severable from the religious milieu in which such abuse can occur.
There is increasing evidence that stronger spousal abuse laws have contributed to reduced
incidents of domestic violence, suggesting that allowing actions for clergy malpractice could have
a similar effect on the pastor-congregant dynamic. Delapane, supra at 180.
321. See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). The
Oregon Court of Appeals reasoned that beliefs could not be dissected into individual components.
The court noted:
Statements made by religious bodies must be viewed in the light of the doctrines of that
religion. Courts may not sift through the teachings of a religion and pick out individual
statements for scrutiny, deciding whether each standing alone is religious .... Although
certain of the theories espoused by Scientology appear to be more psychological than




denomination-specific standard;322 however, the disadvantage of this standard
is that it would require courts to examine religious doctrine and tenets, which
would contravene the First Amendment.
323
This argument fails every logical, moral and philosophical scrutiny.
Certain behaviors, including sleeping with a woman who has come to a cleric,
for counseling, simply fall outside the realm of any religious tenet. The Free
Exercise Clause is a defense only if the defendant's conduct is religious.324
Engaging in a sexual relationship with a parishioner who seeks counseling is
undoubtedly not. Despite this, many clergy and their churches have asserted
First Amendment defenses in sexual misconduct cases, and courts have agreed
that First Amendment rights are implicated.323
b. Role of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
The First Amendment's two clauses referring to religion serve a single
value-that of the individual's freedom of religious beliefs and practices.326
The Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ,327
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from curbing the
individual's religious freedom.32 On the other hand, the Establishment
322. Funston, supra note 1, at 523 (noting that such a denominational standard would invite
the type of inquiry deemed unconstitutional in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)).
323. Id. at 524.
324. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). "[To have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief." Id. The Yoder Court held that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from compelling the respondents to send
their children to high school until they reached sixteen. Id. at 234.
325. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.DN.Y. 1991); Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988).
326. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 1157 (2d ed. 1988),
(citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947)) (noting that the natural result of
government-established religions was the persecution of religious dissenters).
327. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
328. The Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner provided the high water mark for
the protection of the free exercise of religion. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In that case, the Court estab-
lished a "compelling interest" test to justify governmental burdens on the free exercise of religion.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. Under this test, government action that substantially burdened a
person's exercise of religion could only be justified if it were in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Id. at 406-07.
Hence, in that case, a state unemployment compensation scheme that required claimants to be
available for work from Monday to Saturday violated the free exercise rights of a Sabbatarian. Id.
at 410.
However, in more recent years, the Court has moved away from such a deferential stan-
dard. In a recent case, the Court enunciated a new standard, providing that as long as the laws are
religiously neutral and of general applicability, the incidental impact on one's exercise of religion
is constitutionally permissible. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884-85 (1990). Therefore, the violation of a criminal law forbidding the use of peyote could
be validly used to deny unemployment benefits under the Oregon compensation scheme, despite
the fact that the claimants used the peyote in their religious ceremonies. Id. at 1606.
Congress re-established the less deferential "compelling interest" standard of Sherbert in
Free Exercise Clause cases by creating a cause of action under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not purport
to alter Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. § 2000bb-4.
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Clause prevents the government from aiding a particular religion.329 The
government cannot inhibit an individual's choice of religion, or aid religion in
general.33 The amendment thus requires the state to maintain a distance
from the organized church. Although individual freedom is the single value
identified with the First Amendment, the two clauses are at odds with each
other, requiring accommodation and balance."' This balance is accomplished
when the government seeks to achieve only secular goals, and does so in a
religion-neutral way.332 Although the right of religious liberty has been
restricted on occasion,33 this country has a strong jurisprudential history of
maintaining the wall between church and state."' There is mutual societal
329. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW, § 17.1, at 1223 (5th
ed. 1995).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1218-19.
332. Id.
333. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
334. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (standing for the broad principle of absolute
judicial deference to the internal disputes of religious institutions). Where the right of property
ownership in the civil court is dependent on the question of church doctrine, discipline, ecclesiasti-
cal law, rule, custom, or church government:
[Tlhe rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound
view of the relations of church and state under our systems of laws ... is, that, whenev-
er [such questions] have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to
which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id. at 727. The dispute arose over the ownership of local church property in Louisville, Kentucky,
after the General Assembly called for its members in local congregations who believed that slav-
ery was a divine right to "repent and forsake these sins." Id. at 691. The minority faction in the
local church argued that the resolution of the General Assembly was a departure from the doctrine
held when the local church joined the General Assembly. Id. The minority espoused the theory
that the General Assembly held an interest in the property of the local church, subject to an im-
plied trust in favor of the doctrine which existed when they joined. Id. at 693. Any departure from
that doctrine was a breach of trust, and was a forfeiture by the General Assembly of the interest in
the local church property. Id. This case, however, was decided not on constitutional grounds, but
on a common law view of separation of church and state, in marked contrast to the British stan-
dard under which the court must determine the true standard of faith in an organization and deter-
mine which of the contending parties support that standard. Id. at 726. In addition, it was decided
before the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to the states. Three gen-
eral rules were established by the majority for the civil courts' resolution of internal ecclesiastical
disputes. When property is given to a congregation with stipulations as to its use, if use for that
specific purpose is discontinued, the civil courts could order the property returned. Id. at 722.
When property is given for the general use of an independent religious group, the group decides,
by majority decision or another method previously established, use of the property. Id. at 721.
Finally, when property is acquired by a group which constitutes a larger organization, the civil
courts must defer to the decision of the ecclesiastical court. Id. at 727. See also Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (dis-
cussing the limitations imposed on civil courts in awarding church property based on the church
doctrine); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (discussing unconstitutionality of
transfer of property in limiting free exercise of religion).
This doctrine of total judicial deference to churches was somewhat tempered 100 years
later when the Court established a "neutral principles of laws" approach. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602 (1979). In Jones, the Court resolved the issue of whether civil courts, consistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, could resolve an issue involving church property under neutral
principles, or whether they must defer to the decision of the hierarchical church tribunal. Id. at
597. The lower court determined that Jones did not preclude an analysis based on "neutral princi-
ples of law," and the court could legitimately examine documents such as deeds, state trust stat-
utes, and the corporate charter of the local church in order to determine whether there was lan-
guage creating a trust in favor of the regional body. Id. at 600. The Supreme Court remanded the
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benefit to institutional separation-the church cannot use the state and civil
courts to achieve its sectarian purposes, and the state cannot interfere within
the church's sphere of competence.335
The Free Exercise Clause operates when the cleric has a sincerely held
religious belief, and the government action has a coercive effect against his
practice of religion. There cannot be a 'truth test' as to one's faith, and the
objective evidence of the sincerity of the belief has been described as a
fervency test.336 If the presence of the cleric is incidental, and his religious
beliefs are not central to the dispute, the Free Exercise Clause is not
implicated.337 Cases of clergy sexual misconduct form the paradigm for the
application of this principle.
The Establishment Clause, on the other hand, may be implicated in a
negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim if the court has to examine
and assess the employment policies and practices of the religious organization,
and these policies are imbued with religious tenets.338 The Supreme Court in
case, noting that although the First Amendment "prohibits civil courts from resolving church prop-
erty disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice," a state may adopt an approach for
settling property disputes "so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matter, whether the
ritual and liturgy of worship, or the tenets of faith." Id. at 602. The neutral-principles approach
met this criterion, as "it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommo-
date all forms of religious organizations and polity. [It] . . . relies exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law.... It therefore promises to free civil courts com-
pletely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity and practice." Id. at 602-03.
335. See Esbeck, supra note !1, at 12. "Next to the family, religious organizations comprise
the largest single group of societal institutions that generate, mold and propagate those shared
norms essential to a reasonably cohesive society capable of self-government." Id.
336. Id. at 32.
337. TRIBE, supra note 326, at 1185. Professor Tribe emphasizes that there are contexts in
which religiously neutral actions by the govemment should not warrant constitutional consider-
ation unless the neutral government action is a pretext for interference with religion:
Just as the First Amendment's free speech clause is not even implicated in the arrest of
a newscaster for speeding, or in the closure of a bookstore for violation of a health regu-
lation, so the free exercise clause is not implicated in the imprisonment of a member of
clergy for embezzlement, or in the closure of a church as a fire hazard.
Id. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (discussing the constitutional right to
be a conscientious objector to war for religious reasons and what constitutes a religious belief
within that exception); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (discussing religious beliefs as
a constitutional basis to prevent indictment).
Only claims that are "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation" will be denied First
Amendment protection, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). While the Court held
that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment Protection," sexual misconduct by clergy clearly falls within the
first category of conduct--"clearly nonreligious in motivation." Id. at 714.
338. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991). For cases finding a constitutional
barrier against negligent hiring and/or supervision claims, see Isely v Capuchin Province, 880 F.
Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (dismissing claim of negligent hiring); Gibson v. Brewer, No. WD
50238, 1996 WL 93511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d
780 (Wis. 1995). But cf Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994) (refusing to grant churches immunity for being sued in civil actions for
negligent hiring and supervision); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287-88 (Colo. 1988)
("[Wle hold that [the diocese that] knows or should have known that [a clergyman's] conduct
would subject third parties to an unreasonable risk of harm may be directly liable to third parties
for harm proximately caused by his conduct."); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930-31 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992) ("'[E]ven the most liberal construction of the First Amendment will not protect a
religious organization's decision to hire someone who it knows is likely to commit criminal or
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Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,339  in addition to
discussing a church property dispute, determined whether a secular tribunal
could review a church tribunal's defrockment of a bishop. The Supreme Court
found that in a matter of internal church discipline, when the highest clerical
tribunal has spoken, a detailed review was impermissible under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.3 °
c. First Amendment Inapplicable
A broad reading of Serbian Orthodox Diocese suggests that cases
involving clergy sexual misconduct would have no place in the secular courts
if a hierarchical church tribunal has made a decision. Some commentators 34'
and courts342 argue that the First Amendment bars all clergy malpractice
actions because governmental interference in religion is prohibited. 343 This
argument is flawed in several respects. The general view is that "government
violates the Establishment Clause only if its actions are born of a religious
intent, or if they exert primarily religious effects, or if they create excessive
church-state entanglement." 3" Courts do not violate the Establishment Clause
when they try a minister for crimes or entertain a priest's action for breach of
contract. The Establishment Clause does not imply that clergy can never be
present in a civil court of law. It insulates a priest or minister only when he
engages in conduct related to religion. 45 Sleeping with his counselees does
tortious acts."') (quoting Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 590); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386
(Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("[P]laintiff's claim for outrageous conduct is not premised on [the] mere fact
that Christenson is a pastor, but on the fact that, because he was plaintiff's pastor and counselor, a
special relationship of trust and confidences developed.").
339. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
340. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated:
In short, the [Constitution] permit[sl hierarchical religious organizations to establish their
own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals
for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesias-
tical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subor-
dinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding
upon them.
Id. at 724-25.
341. See Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice, supra note 1, at 176; O'Reilly & Strasser, supra
note 207, at 55.
342. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla.
1993).
343. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses have been incorpo-
rated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states by the Court's deci-
sions in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8 (1947), respectively. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses represent fundamental aspects of liberty and must be protected from state
and federal interference. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 903. In a case involving mail fraud, the Ballards
claimed they could cure diseases through supernatural gifts. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
80-81 (1944). The Court stated that the First Amendment prevented the courts from examining the
truth of the religious representations made by the Ballards. Id. at 86.
344. TRIBE, supra note 326, at 1187. The excessive entanglement test was established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), although some have argued that recent First Amend-
ment jurisprudence shows less reliance on the Lemon test. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of
the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos? 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 581, 583 (1995).
345. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 109 (1952). If subversive ac-
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not fit that description. Sexual battery during religious or secular counseling, is
simply not a religious activity that should trigger the First Amendment when
courts try to curtail such activity.34 In cases like Nally where the content of
the counseling is in question, clergy should be accorded First Amendment
protection, but this should not extend to sexual misconduct cases.
347
In Byrd v. Faber3" the court was concerned that an inquiry into whether
a religious organization had exercised due care in hiring would require
examination of employment policies and practices, which would be "infused
with the religious tenets of the particular sect involved. If the state becomes
involved in assessing the adequacy of these standards, serious entanglement
problems may arise under the First Amendment." '349 This court was overly
protective of the church, setting up heightened 'pleading requirements for plain-
tiffs to avoid summary judgment, while acknowledging that if a religious
organization hired someone with a history of criminal or tortious behavior, the
First Amendment would not protect the religious organization from
liability.35 ° These fears are unfounded. There is no need for a court to
inquire into whether a member of the clergy engaging in such behavior acted
in conformance with church teachings on clergy conduct, or to call expert
witnesses; the court can declare, as a matter of law, that a clergy engaged in a
sexual liaison with a counselee has breached a fiduciary duty owed to the
counselee.
If some religious group were to claim that sexual activity was a
sacramental rite, and that intercourse with twelve-year-old vestal virgins were
an integral aspect of that rite, the state would have a compelling interest in
protecting its citizens and would not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause in
regulating such conduct.35" '
tion "should actually be attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense."
Id.; see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (hold-
ing that the respondent's religious motivation for using the drug peyote did not place the respon-
dents beyond the reach of a criminal statute that was not specifically directed at their religious
practice, and that was concededly constitutional as applied to those who used the drug for other
reasons).
346. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 88 ("Regardless of what the church claims are its canoni-
cal standards for the proper behavior of priests, the civil law can say that sexual seduction of a
counselee is not even 'arguably religious,' that it is wrongful and thus punishable in tort.").
347. Nally, 763 P.2d at 960.
348. 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991).
349. Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 590; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976) (holding that constitutional prohibitions prevent civil courts' intervention in eccle-
siastical affairs, and that even an arbitrary decision of a church hierarchical body would be off
limits to the civil courts if it would involve any review of religious doctrine and practice); Pritzlaff
v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920
(1996) (holding that plaintiff's claim for negligent hiring, supervision or retention of priest who
allegedly coerced her to have sexual relations with him was barred by the First Amendment, be-
cause a determination of competence as a Catholic priest would require interpretation of church
canons and internal church policies and practices).
350. Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 590.
351. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that statute which pro-
hibited polygamy was constitutional, and religious belief did not excuse adherence to law since
"[t]o permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself"); see also United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that an Amish employer was obligated to pay
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Statutory rape laws and a public policy of protecting the health and
welfare of the citizenry in general, and minors in particular, would justify
using the state's police powers to curb this "religious" sexual activity. Courts
have intervened in cases involving the employment of minors by religious
organizations finding that the application of the child labor laws and other
aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) did not violate the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 52 The courts
also reject these First Amendment arguments in cases involving the minimum
wage and equal pay provisions of the FLSA, as well as state workers'
compensation laws.353 These examples demonstrate that mere potential for
entanglement with religion is not always a shield for the religious employer.
When the potential victims are women whose judgment has been clouded by a
combination of factors, the state is justified in intervening. The state allows
women to recover for malpractice when their psychologists have sex with
them, and it should intervene on the same grounds here.
The First Amendment does not apply exclusively to clergy. Theoretically,
in cases against psychologists, psychiatrists, or therapists-where the courts
clearly have jurisdiction-the defendants could also hide under the Free
Exercise umbrella by asserting that the sex furthered a "sincerely held
religious belief."'354 Exempting clergy as a class without examining whether
the "contested conduct is in fact religious in character" '355 addresses the
problem with a sword, when a scalpel would be adequate. The First
Amendment requires the identical standard for secular counselors and clergy
engaged in counseling. The emphasis should be on the behavior, not the
religious or secular status of the offender.
Some courts have recognized the fallacy in providing First Amendment
protection for clerics who have sex with their counselees when the Free
Exercise Clause protects only religious beliefs or practices:
social security taxes despite his religious convictions); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 145, 158
(1944) (holding mother not constitutionally protected from application of child labor laws); Bra-
unfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609-10 (1961) (upholding validity of Sunday closing laws). The
First Amendment has never been considered to confer a right to engage in activity threatening the
public safety, peace, or order, no matter how religiously motivated the behavior is. The freedom to
believe is not synonymous with the freedom to act. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-90.
352. Brock v. Wendell's Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Tony
& Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (holding it proper to extend
FLSA to religious foundation). See generally David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Reli-
gion Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27, 51 (1992)
(discussing decisions of the Supreme Court which have favored the religious employer at the
expense of the employee). Professor Gregory asserts:
As the Burger and now Rehnquist Court matured, this activist, pro-institutional, statist
jurisprudence became increasingly inimical to the severely debilitated First Amendment
and Title VII rights of religious employees, provisions which theoretically were designed
to promote free exercise of religion and to protect employees against unlawful employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of religion.
Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted).
353. South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1203, 1211 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 754 (1991).




Notwithstanding the due deference that we are required to give in
determining the legitimacy of religious beliefs or practices, we cannot
accept the premise that the sexual activities in which Pressnell is
alleged to have participated are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. Indeed it is clear that the alleged conduct was nonreligious in
motivation - a bizarre deviation from normal spiritual counseling
practices of ministers in the Lutheran Church. Therefore, since
Pressnell's alleged conduct falls outside the scope of First
Amendment protections, he may be subject to liability for injuries
arising from his tortious conduct.356
Despite this declaration, the court rejected each of the plaintiff's causes of
action.
Sometimes, the injection of the First Amendment in these state tort claims
arguably violates the basic rule of judicial decision making-that a court
should not consider constitutional issues unless such a decision is
essential.357 Despite this rule, courts, in their eagerness to dismiss these
actions, decide them on First Amendment grounds.35 s
d. Neutral Principles Paradigm
Clergy sexual malpractice actions could also be decided under "neutral
principles of law" that do not implicate the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court determined in Jones v. WolfP9 that as long as the civil courts remained
free of entanglement in questions of "religious doctrine, polity and
356. Id. at 1238; see also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988), where the court
noted that:
[While] marital counseling by a cleric presents difficult questions because it often incor-
porates both religious counseling and secular counseling ... [iun the spiritual counseling
context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the defendant can show that the con-
duct that allegedly caused the plaintiffs distress was in fact 'part of the belief and pract-
ices' of the religious group ... [when, however,] the alleged wrongdoing of a cleric
clearly falls outside the beliefs and doctrine of his religion, he cannot avail himself of
the protection afforded by the [Flirst [A]mendment.
Id. at 283-84. However, other courts have claimed that the Free Exercise Clause is implicated in
this type of action. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994). In Dausch, the Sev-
enth Circuit relied on the district court in finding that
Illinois does not recognize a claim for clergy malpractice .... [C]ourts that have consid-
ered but rejected such a claim have recognized the free exercise implications of any such
recognition.... [S]uch free exercise considerations would not be relevant if Rykse's
conduct was not part of the belief and practices of his church .... [T]he district court
concluded that Mrs. Dausch had failed to allege adequately that Rykse's psychological
counseling was not part of the church's religious beliefs and practices. As a result, con-
cluded the court, the free exercise clause of the First Amendment was implicated and
Mrs. Dausch failed to state a valid claim.
Id. at 1428.
357. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) (considering a non-constitutional issue
before a constitutional issue pursuant to the Court's "duty to avoid deciding constitutional ques-
tions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case").
358. See, e.g., Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
359. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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practice,' ° they could decide questions of ownership of church property.
The civil court might have to scrutinize religious documents-e.g., a
constitution-but if this examination relied on secular terms, rather than
religious precepts, it would pass First Amendment muster. The court
concluded that "[o]n balance .... the promise of non-entanglement and
neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates
for what will be occasional problems in application."36' The Supreme Court
again prohibited excessive entanglement, but affirmed the use of neutral
principles in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church.362
Is a woman less valuable to our society than property? If the Supreme
Court has allowed this compromise in situations involving property, afortiori,
it should be available in the more important issues of the health and welfare of
citizens. Public policy considerations which allow state courts to intervene in
property disputes should allow such intervention in matters involving clergy
malpractice.363 Clergy malpractice involves abuse of power and sexual abuse,
and the courts can apply the neutral principles for resolving these disputes.
Such principles can be adopted from analogous situations involving other
360. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
361. Id. at 604.
362. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). In deciding a property dispute, the Supreme Court held that the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment forbid any application of a de-
parture-from-doctrine rule. Mary Elizabeth, 393 U.S. at 450. The Georgia Supreme Court had
determined that the Presbyterian Church-U.S.A. substantially departed from established Presbyteri-
an doctrine and awarded the property in dispute to the local members and ministers who had with-
drawn from the main organization. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church,
159 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1968). The Supreme Court stated that in resolving civil disputes involving
churches, secular authorities may not engage "in the forbidden process of interpreting and weigh-
ing church doctrine." Mary Elizabeth, 393 U.S. at 451. The court rejected the departure-from-
doctrine rule, saying it "can play no role in any future judicial proceedings." Id. at 450 (emphasis
added).
363. An appellate court in Illinois reversed a trial court's dismissal of an action against a
Baptist minister and the church on First Amendment grounds. The appellate court used neutral
principles analysis:
We cannot conclude from plaintiffs' complaint that their cause of action against First
Baptist Church of Energy will infringe upon, or place a burden upon, the church's free-
dom to exercise its religion. Inquiring into whether the church was negligent in its fail-
ure to protect plaintiffs from the sexual misconduct of its minister may not call into
question the church's religious beliefs or practices or subject them to analysis or scruti-
ny.... [T]he minister's sexual misconduct was not rooted in the church's religious
beliefs and was outside the boundaries of the church's ecclesiastical beliefs and
practices.
Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
In a case of first impression in the New Jersey courts, an intermediate appellate court re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of a clergy malpractice claim, articulating a neutral principles
model for the resolution of clergy malpractice claims:
[Olne test to determine whether a cause of action against a cleric is cognizable in civil
courts is whether adjudication of the claim requires an evaluation of dogma or ritual, or
other matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. In the present case it is unlikely that de-
fendants will assert that sex with a counselee by a pastoral counselor is sanctioned by or
somehow involves tenets of the Episcopalian church, or would otherwise create an en-
tanglement with religious beliefs or rituals of First Amendment concern.
F.G. v. McDonell, 677 A.2d 258, 262-63. (N.J. 1996).
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helping professionals. The mere existence of a clerical collar should not
prevent their application.
Right-thinking judges are concerned about doctrinal entanglement in
religious values: "[W]hereas the other forms of entanglement involve
government in the apparatus of religion, doctrinal entanglement involves
government in religion's very spirit, in its decision on core matters of belief
and ritual."3" But the sex that underlies clergy malpractice has no
relationship to the beliefs or rituals of established religions, and courts and
legislatures addressing it would not be entangling themselves in matters of
belief or ritual. No religious truths are implicated, unless the defendants were
to claim a religious experience in the sexual contact.365 Even so, whether
these views are sincerely held could be questioned."6
e. Sexual Activity As Conduct, Not Content
Courts have consistently held that sexual relationships between a secular
therapist and a patient constitute malpractice.367 The courts have permitted
recovery for emotional distress and other damages.3" Despite the
acknowledgment by the founders of modern psychology, Freud and Jung, of
the debt owed to the church and the similarity between secular and religious
counseling,3" the courts have resisted liability for clergy who engage in
similar behavior with their parishioners during counseling. Some courts,
however, have recognized that a court can apply a secular standard to clergy
when the conduct is secular and tortious.37 °
If a woman is sexually abused by a cleric, goes to the church government
which then begins an investigation, resulting in charges and an ecclesiastical
trial at which the clergy is exonerated, is the woman precluded from seeking a
364. TRIBE, supra note 326, at 1231 (citing to the Supreme Court's assertion in Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), that such entanglement "would lead to the total subversion of...
religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts
and have them reversed").
365. The Supreme Court decided that no judge or jury could decide whether the claims of a
religious experience by defendants in a mail fraud case were true, although they could determine
whether the defendants' beliefs were sincerely held. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87
(1944).
366. Id.
367. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); McNi-
choles v. Subotnik, 12 F.3d 105, 109-10 (8th Cir. 1993); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d
1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1984).
368. Cruz, supra note 4, at 503 & n.30 (citing Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (health service counselor); Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 808-
09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (psychiatrist); Horak v. Binis, 474 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Il1. App. Ct. 1985)
(social worker); Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (psychologist)); see
also Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602 (I1. 1991) (holding that damages for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress caused by sexual misconduct of psychologist not subject to the "zone of
danger" rule; the damages are recoverable as an element of malpractice).
369. P. C. Vitz, Psychology As Religion, in BAKER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 932,
933-34 (David G. Benner ed., 1985).
370. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 2153 (1994); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp 1169, 1174 (N.D. Tex.
1995).
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civil remedy? On the other hand, if the church determines that some
disciplinary action is required, does the cleric have a recourse in the secular
courts? If either party argues that the church did not follow its own rules, can
the civil courts intervene?
The Supreme Court held in Serbian Orthodox Diocese that civil courts
cannot make a determination after the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a
hierarchical church has spoken.37" ' Analysis of whether the church's action is
consistent with canonical church laws and regulations would entail inquiry into
the procedures that ecclesiastical law requires the church to follow, which is
forbidden by the First Amendment.372 The Supreme Court asserts that "it is
the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by
objective criteria." '373 Notwithstanding plaintiff complaints that the decision
was arbitrary or there was lack of due process, the ecclesiastical decisions of
church tribunals are not appealable in the civil courts.37 4 This deference to
the First Amendment exceeds the original intent of either the Free Exercise or
the Establishment Clauses. The Supreme Court has condoned a level of
immunity for hierarchical churches' decision-making which extends beyond its
own guideline, whether the inquiry is "at the core of ecclesiastical
concem."
375
A hypothetical illustrates the difficulties and potential injustice inherent in
this approach. A priest employed "at will" by a church organization which
owns several nursing homes is assigned to one of these nursing homes. A
nurse's aide refuses to bring patients from her floor to a service led by the
priest. He complains to her superior in writing. She immediately lodges a
sexual harassment complaint against him, alleging that he gave her unwanted
gifts and made advances toward her. Within days the priest is summoned by
personnel and told to accept a suspension or resign. He is not given charges in
writing, not allowed to have legal counsel present, or face his accuser, as
required by the diocesan procedures. He accepts the suspension, while
protesting his innocence, then consults with legal counsel. In response to
rumors concerning his suspension, he circulates a memo to his fellow
employees informing them of the reason for his absence. He is summarily
dismissed. The organization has failed, in every respect, to follow its own
procedures. Should this priest have recourse in the civil court if the
ecclesiastical courts fail him? If he were not a priest, despite his "at-will"
status which suggests that he can be fired without cause, courts should find
that the policies and procedures in an employee handbook set certain minimal
guidelines to be followed.376 The priest was fired for alleged sexual
371. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708.
372. Id. at 713.
373. Id. at 714-15.
374. Id. at 713.
375. Id. at 717.
376. Some courts have found that an employee handbook may create a unilateral contract
when (1) the handbook is sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer to the employee; (2)
the handbook has been communicated to and accepted by the employee; and (3) the employee, by
continuing to work, has provided the necessary consideration. Yockey v. Iowa, 540 N.W.2d 418,
[Vol. 74:1
CLERGY MALPRACTICE REVISITED
harassment; presumably, without the sexual harassment accusation, he would
still be employed. If the core of the concern is the sexual harassment, not an
ecclesiastical concern, the priest, as well as his accuser, should be entitled to
due process. If the church is unwilling to provide due process, the courthouse
door should not be closed. The court's approach is too indulgent of the
church, with too little concern for the parties harmed.
The Supreme Court in Serbian Orthodox Diocese stated that "it would be
unconstitutional for state tribunals to question a church's suspension or
expulsion of a member for defying the church's hierarchy and challenging the
church's authority through civil litigation." '377 In cases involving sexual
misconduct, because the challenge is not based on an "ecclesiastical
concern" 378 regarding the cleric's religious beliefs, or the doctrine of the
church, the challenge should be heard by the civil courts. When clergy are
involved, some courts have taken a "hands off' approach.379 It appears that
the churches themselves, or the state legislatures, are left to effect needed
change.
C. Education
Education of clergy may be the first line of defense in deterring sexual
abuse within the counseling relationship. The prevalence of this form of abuse
indicates that an ostrich-like reaction will further exacerbate the problem.
Courses in the psycho-sexual dynamics of the counseling relationship and
human sexuality should be included in every seminary. If celibacy is required
of the clergy, counseling in coping with the demands of this choice is
required. Proactive measures in training all clergy is essential. Other approach-
es are necessary once the sexual contact has occurred. For clergy who are not
sexual predators, but merely succumb to bad judgment, recognition of the
warning signs and a procedure for referral or otherwise terminating the
counseling relationship is advisable. In order to heal both the clergy and the
congregation, the church has to be willing to discuss sex and sexuality and the
role power plays in sexual abuse. If the church responds sympathetically to the
victim, rather than adversarially, the victims are less likely to seek civil
remedies.
422 (Iowa 1995); see also Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (hold-
ing employee handbooks or oral representations may change "at will" employment); Shelton v.
Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 459 S.E.2d 851 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an employee hand-
book created a jury issue on existence of employment contract); Sanchez v. Life Care Ctrs. of
America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that an employer's right to discharge may be
changed by an employee handbook).
377. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 720. For a description of the disciplinary
measures in hierarchical, representative, and congregational churches, see Esbeck, supra note 11,
at 63-76.
378. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 717.
379. See supra Part III.B.
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CONCLUSION
In addition to actions taken by churches, the legislature is best suited to
fashion a remedy for the growing number of people sexually abused by clergy
during counseling. A "bright line" prohibition of such behavior, tailored to the
specific evil to be remedied, will protect counselees while avoiding the pitfalls
encountered when the courts attempted to handle the problem. Churches
should support such legislation because it will ultimately inure to their
benefit. The courts can also provide remedies. Viewing the clergy as having a
fiduciary duty to protect the counselee can provide the basis for a higher
standard of care-one to act in the best interest of the counselee. The cleric
and parishioner share a very special relationship-one that is similar to the
professional relationship between psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker
and patient. This relationship is one of trust and respect-for the professional
achievements of the cleric, as well as for the cleric's spirituality. Consequent-
ly, it may be argued that a fiduciary duty is created between the clergy and
parishioners. The law recognizes that the existence of a fiduciary relationship
can be used to establish a legal duty. This duty is frequently found in
malpractice suits against medical professionals, based on the fiduciary
relationship between doctor and patient. Within the relationship between clergy
and parishioner, this supplies the first prong in the elements necessary for
establishing negligence.
Reports of sexual abuse by clergy weaken faith in the church as an
institution. The churches' past response to reports suggested more interest in
protecting "members of the club" (the clergy) than in healing the victims of
abuse. The church hierarchy, the accused clergy, the accuser, and the
congregation conspire to keep the secret, even after it has been revealed. This
act does not empower the victim, or future potential victims. Imposing a duty
to disclose on churches when clergy seek transfers within the denomination
will protect future victims. Openness in handling these accusations-genuine
ones as well as false-will inevitably lead to greater respect for church
leaders, and can serve as a "witness" by strengthening the spiritual family of
the church and bringing more people to the faith.
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